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REMEDIAL PROPORTIONALITY

INTRODUCTION
The evolution of the Supreme Court’s remedial jurisprudence evinces a quest for
the ultimate judicial measure of appropriate relief, emerging as a norm of remedial
proportionality.1 The Court’s decisions since 2000 on punitive damages, injunctions,
and remedial legislation, all mandate a strict balance and precise measurement in the
formulation of civil remedies. These cases have often fallen below the radar of general
interest or have been ignored for their remedial significance.2 However, these cases
demonstrate, somewhat surprisingly, the manner in which the Court has ventured into
the arena of common-law remedies to unexpectedly alter the foundational principles of
crafting remedies. This article exposes and critiques the extent to which proportionality
dominates the remedial decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the new
millennium.
“Proportionality” is fast becoming a universal standard of rationality in the
international public law context.3 Indeed, “[t]he concept has received far more
elaboration and evaluation outside of the United States.”4 Proportionality is a general
legal principle for avoiding excess and “reviewing the conformity to the law of any
public discretionary action.”5 It is a “yardstick for measuring the appropriate
relationship between the ends and the means of discretionary action.”6 International
jurists use proportionality to evaluate the extent to which government intrudes on the
paramount individual rights of citizens.7 However, American legal scholars have not
embraced the advent of this new test because it “sounds unfamiliar, dangerous for the
protection of civil rights, and illustrative of the conservatism of the Court.”8 These
fears appear well-founded as the Supreme Court has co-opted proportionality as its own

1

A purist’s definition of “remedies” is used here to mean only questions regarding the civil sanction
assessed in the case whether in the form of monetary relief or official directive. Excluded from the
definition of remedy are other legal issues interrelated to remedies, such as immunity, private rights of
action, preemption, and justiciability. See Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies, 76
WASH. L. REV. 67 (2001).
2
See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2004 Term, Leading Cases, 119 HARV. L. REV. 169 (2005); Charles H.
Whitebread, Going Out With a Whimper: A Term of Tinkering and Fine Tuning, The Supreme Court’s
2004-05 Term, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 77 (2005).
3
See Vicki C. Jackson, Being Proportional About Proportionality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 803, 803-04
(2004) (reviewing DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW (2004)); see also T. Jeremy Gunn,
Deconstructing Proportionality in Limitations Analysis, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 465 (2005); Elisabeth
Zoller, Congruence and Proportionality for Congressional Enforcement Powers: Cosmetic Change or
Velvet Revolution?, 78 IND. L. J. 567, 568 (2003); D.W. Greig, Reciprocity, Proportionality, and the Law
of Treaties, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 295, 322 (1994).
4
Jackson, supra note 3, at 803-04; Gunn, supra note 3, at 465; Zoller, supra note 3, at 568.
5
Zoller, supra note 3, at 581-82.
6
Id. at 582.
7
See Jackson supra note 3, at 804; see, e.g., R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. 103 (Can.).
8
Zoller, supra note 3, at 568 (“From a comparative law perspective, the new test is not as bad as it
sounds. . . . [I]t introduces into American constitutional law a standard of judicial review that has proved
to be useful in many continental European countries. . . .”).
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standard for protecting governmental and corporate interests against the individual
plaintiff.
The article begins by taking a positivist view to describe how the Court has
utilized proportionality in its remedial decisions. It first explains the Court’s theory of
remedial essentialism, which forms the foundation for the rule of remedial
proportionality. The theory of remedial essentialism formalistically separates the
remedy from the right, and it is this binary concept that establishes the premise of
balance inherent in proportionality. This notion of balance or equilibrium draws on
theories from Aristotle and law and economics mandating a precise remedial balance as
a proxy for justice. Practically speaking, the rule of proportionality engages the court in
a type of “Three Bears” analysis under which it evaluates whether the remedy is too big,
too small, or just right. The article synthesizes the most recent Supreme Court cases on
remedies to flesh out the principles of proportionality driving the Court’s decisions.
These remedial decisions emanate from a wide variety of factual contexts, including
abortion, water rights, insurance, patents, and tribal immunity. Yet, the decisions
coalesce in transsubstantive fashion around the assumed foundational truth of remedial
proportionality as the ultimate measure of civil justice.
After tracing the development of strict proportionality in the Supreme Court, the
article then engages in a normative analysis to evaluate whether proportionality should
in fact be the guiding principle of remedies law. It begins with the identification of the
Court’s justifications for the rule. The Court seems to value proportionality for its
rationality and objectivity, judicial restraint and minimalism, and reciprocal response.
However, the article reveals these claims of rationality, restraint, and reciprocity as
myths. Proportionality is not an objective standard. Continued reliance upon these
myths creates significant legal dangers by obscuring the subjective framing issues
inherent in a rule of comparison and unduly deferring to the interests of the wrongdoers.
When the rule of proportionality is deconstructed, it becomes apparent that
proportionality is not a rule of restraint, but rather one of activism. The article
ultimately rejects the continued use of remedial proportionality and its fostering of
judicial activism by the highest Court. Instead, it recommends a return to the traditional
judicial review of remedies deferring to the initial factfinders in each case.
1. PROPORTIONALITY AS REMEDIAL EQUILIBRIUM
In the Supreme Court’s recent remedial decisions, the Court appears to be
searching for the perfect measure of relief in each case. The series of important
remedial decisions reveals that the Court has seized upon proportionality as its
foundational principle of objectivity to resolve questions of remedy.9 The Court has not
articulated its reasons for the adoption of proportionality as the governing principle nor
explored its theoretical underpinnings. Reading between the lines, the Court (except for
Justice Scalia) seems to view the proportionality rule as an objective rule that can
consistently enforce the norm of fairness in crafting judicial remedies. The Court
9

Marci A. Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of Proportionality Analysis Under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 469, 479 (1999).
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assumes it has adopted a neutral principle of law that constrains the power of judicial
interpretation. This formalistic and mechanical rule of law now appears to be the
governing principle upon which most of the Court’s remedial decisions will be based.
A. Remedial Essentialism
Remedial essentialism, the theoretical premise that a remedy is conceptually
isolated from the underlying substantive right, is the necessary predicate to the Court’s
principle of remedial proportionality. This formalistic separation of remedy from right
provides the foundation for proportionality, for without two separate interests, the
notion of balancing carries little meaning.
The Court’s legal formalism depicts rights as primary and remedies as
secondary.10 A primary right is a legal duty, guarantee, or expectation, whereas the
remedial right is the consequence or sanction following the non-compliance with the
primary right.11 “Rights essentialism” isolates the core legal principle of right from the
translation of that right through facts and policy in the real world.12 For judges, this
means that remedial decisions imposing tangible consequences for the right leave the
right inviolate rather than diminished or enhanced by the practical reality.13 Rights
essentialism establishes a binary concept of right and remedy that subordinates
remedies to the more valuable core legal value. In other words, “rights and remedies
are made of different stuff—and the rights stuff is better.”14 Remedial essentialism is
the necessary corollary that segregates the inferior remedy in judicial decisionmaking to
immunize the right.
Examples of remedial essentialism are apparent throughout the Court’s remedial
jurisprudence. Take, for example, the Court’s 2006 decision in Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of Northern New England.15 In Ayotte, New Hampshire appealed the
invalidation of its Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act, which the lower courts
struck down in its entirety due to the absence of a medical emergency exception.16
Justice O’Connor, writing for a unanimous Court repeatedly stated that the decision was
simply a “question of remedy” and not one of legal rights.17 In the decision’s opening
10

See HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 122-34 (William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey eds., 1994) (creating
dichotomy between primary and remedial rights); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961)
(distinguishing between primary rights of substantive claim and secondary rights of remedy).
Tracy A. Thomas, Congress’ Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673, 684
(2001) [hereinafter “Remedial Rights”].
12
Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 900
(1999).
13
Levinson, supra note 12, at 900 (arguing that normative theories about constitutional rights should not
be separated from the positive realities of their remedial enforcement).
14
Id. at 858; see Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 678 (1983) (describing the
right/remedy distinction in constitutional law as “pure rights, dirty remedies”).
15
126 S. Ct. 961 (2006).
16
Id. at 964.
17
Id. at 964, 967; Linda Greenhouse, Court Walks Fine Line on Teenage Abortions, INT’L HERALD TRIB.
2 (Jan. 2, 2006) (“The studiously bland 10-page opinion carefully sidestepped the abortion debate that has
been such a prominent feature of public discourse about the Court’s future.”).
11
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line, Justice O’Connor emphasized: “We do not revisit our abortion precedents today,
but rather address a question of remedy.”18 The Court went on to vacate the
invalidation of the abortion statute, holding that “invalidating a statute entirely is not
always necessary or justified, for lower courts may be able to render narrow declaratory
and injunctive relief.”19 Thus, the Court asserted that as a remedial decision, the Ayotte
opinion had no impact upon its abortion jurisprudence.20
The Court’s essentialist view of remedies is also seen in City of Sherrill v.
Oneida Indian Nation.21 In Sherrill, the Court explicitly emphasized that the right is
very different from the remedy: “The substantive questions whether the plaintiff has
any right or the defendant any duty, and if so what it is, are very different questions
from the remedial questions whether this remedy or that is preferred, and what the
measure of the remedy is.”22 The Sherrill Court reiterated the right of the Oneida tribe
to ownership of ancient tribal lands it had purchased on the open market, but applied the
remedial doctrine of laches to deny the requested declaratory and injunctive relief
exempting the tribal owners from county taxes.23 The Court raised the remedial issue
sua sponte and decided the case under “standards of federal equity practice,” refusing to
consider the substantive questions of tax immunity and definitions of “Indian country”
decided below and argued by the parties.24 The eight-Justice majority25 rested its
18

Id. at 964. See Tony Mauro, High Court Sidesteps Dispute Over Parental Notification for Abortion,
183 N.J.L.J. 197 (Jan. 23, 2006) (stating that Justice O’Connor avoided a major showdown on abortion
rights in her valedictory writing which was based on the narrower remedial ground).
19
Ayotte, 126 S.Ct. at 964.
20
However, as the Court admitted, this holding does in fact revisit past precedents by contradicting the
decision in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000), invalidating an abortion statute in its entirety.
Ayotte, 126 S.Ct. at 969. See also Note, After Ayotte: The Need to Defend Abortion Rights With Renewed
“Purpose,” 119 HARV. L. REV. 2552 (2006) (noting that courts have traditionally used a broad, facial
invalidation remedy for unconstitutional abortion statutes, but that Ayotte suggests the Court may be
rethinking their approach as to the function that broad abortion remedies have served); Mauro, supra note
19 (quoting opinion that Ayotte “can be read as almost an explicit invitation for states to revive or repass
restrictions that previously have been struck down in toto.”).
21
544 U.S. 197 (2005).
22
Id. at 213 (citing D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.2 p. 3 (1973)).
23
Id. at 216-17. Laches is an equitable defense that bars a remedy when plaintiffs have unreasonably
delayed in prosecuting the action causing prejudice to the other side. DOBBS, supra note 22. Here, the
Court said that the long lapse of time (200 years) during which the Oneidas did not seek to revive their
sovereign control through equitable relief in court, and the dramatic changes in the character of the
property from reservation to city during that time precluded the tribe “from gaining the disruptive remedy
it now seeks.” Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 199.
24
Id. at 214 n.8. While the Court claimed that its remedial decision did not address the underlying
substantive rights, the precedential effect of the case has been to the contrary. See Amy Borgman, Note,
Stamping Out the Embers of Tribal Sovereignty: City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation and Its
Aftermath, 10 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RES. J. 59, 60 (2006) (“Sherrill has dramatically altered the legal
landscape against which courts will consider tribes’ claims. . . . [T]he message is clear: the American
Court system will no longer sympathize with tribes seeking retribution for past wrongs.”); Leading Cases,
Availability of Equitable Relief, 119 HARV. L. REV. 347 (2005) (arguing that the Court correctly ruled
given its inability to adjudicate the type of reparative justice claim raised by the Indians that is properly
left to the political branches).
25
Justice Stevens dissented on grounds that the Court’s decision could not be squared with its prior
decision authorizing damages for the same claim, stating that the “Court’s reliance on the distinctions
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decision solidly upon the distinction between right and remedy: the tribe had a “right”
to tribal property ownership, but no remedial mechanism to enforce that right
prospectively.26
Again, in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange the Court held that “a right is distinct
from the provision of remedies for violations of that right.”27 The Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit had held that a patent holder’s right to exclude competitors from
practicing an invention was sufficiently strong to merit a presumption of qualifying for
an injunction in every case.28 This categorical rule altered the common-law principle of
injunctive relief which requires a showing of the inadequacy of plaintiff’s monetary
remedies and a balancing of hardships between the parties, court, and public.29 In
reversing the Federal Circuit’s remedial decision, a unanimous Supreme Court
disaggregated right from remedy in the patent context and remanded the decision with
clear instructions that the right not dictate the appropriate balance for equitable relief.30
In other words, the injunctive remedy is an absolute legal principle which should not be
diluted by the interaction with the attendant legal right.
This right/remedy dichotomy has been criticized by scholars, including me, who
have illustrated how the measure or enforcement of a remedy, or lack thereof,
significantly alters the effective meaning of the substantive legal right.31 It was the
American legal realists who believed that it was erroneous to view a legal right
abstracted from the remedy available in the legal system.32 “As form cannot always be
separate from substance in a work of art, so adjective or remedies aspects cannot be
between law and equity and between substantive rights and remedies is indefensible.” 544 U.S. at 226.
He also challenged the Court’s use of laches to resolve the case since the issued had not been briefed and
the tribe could avoid the equitable defense of laches by reasserting their claim for immunity as a defense
in a state tax collection action. Id. at 224-26.
26
Id. at 221. On remand, the district court held that New York state law precludes county taxation of
property owned by Indian tribes. Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison County, 401 F. Supp. 2d 219, 232
(N.D.N.Y. 2005).
27
126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006).
28
MercExchange v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
29
126 S. Ct. at 1841.
30
Id. at 1840. Similarly, in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 764 (2007), the Court, in an
opinion joined by all of the Justices except Justice Thomas, overturned the Federal Circuit’s attempt to
carve out a special rule of declaratory relief in patent cases. The Federal Circuit denied jurisdiction on a
declaratory judgment claim where the party to the patent licensing agreement had not yet breached the
agreement. Id. at 768. The Court reaffirmed the rule that a party need not subject itself to penalty prior
to seeking declaratory relief. Id. at 772.
31
Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 11, at 687-88 (arguing for the “unified right theory” of remedies
in which the remedy and its definitional guarantee are two components of one unified whole); Levinson,
supra note 12, at 858 (arguing that normative theories of constitutional rights cannot be separated from
realities of remedial enforcement); David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores
and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 66 (1997) (discussing the
“inextricable relationship” between right and remedy in the context of congressional remedies for
immigration under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter
Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S. CAL. REV. 735 (1992) (viewing constitutional rights through
the prism of remedies).
32
See Friedman, supra note 31, at 736; see, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1244 (1931).
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parted entirely from substantive ones.”33 For example, a contractual promise is only as
good as the remedy that backs it up; for if the law sustains an efficient breach, a
contracting party is not in fact required to honor his legal promise.34
Scholars have thus criticized the overly formalistic conceptualization of rights
that minimizes the importance of remedies, and masks the effect of remedial
decisions.35 Professor Levinson articulated how the “deeply embedded and deeply
misleading” theory of rights essentialism provides an “oversimplified picture of the
relationship between rights and remedies.”36 Instead, Levinson and others have
demonstrated how remedies are functionally related, and inextricably intertwined with
rights.37 Remedies are the practical, real, and functional component that actualizes the
right and makes it operational between the parties.38
Despite this academic insight, the Court seems mired in the formalistic belief
that remedies are isolated legal concepts that should be adjudicated apart from the
connected substantive right. Adopting a modernist philosophy, the Court has
constructed an allegedly objective rule of proportionality to reconcile the binary
right/remedy construct and constrain the power of judicial interpretation.39 This
foundational assumption of remedial essentialism effectively minimizes the significance
of the Court’s remedial decisions by subordinating the ancillary remedy to the important
foundational right.40
It is the binary thinking of remedial essentialism that makes proportionality
possible as a formalist rule. However, it is also this essentialist thinking that begins the
Court’s detour in the jurisprudence of remedies.

33

Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 116 (1945) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
LON L. FULLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW (1947); Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 11, at 693.
35
Levinson, supra note 12, at 858; Thomas, supra note 12; Zeigler, supra note 1, at 67; Friedman, supra
note 31, at 738.
36
Levinson, supra note 12, at 858.
37
Id.; see Friedman, supra note 31, at 735; Gewirtz, supra note 14, at 678-79; Thomas, Remedial Rights,
supra note 11, at 687-88; Donald Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement
of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 665-66 (1987).
38
Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 11, at 687-88.
39
Cf. GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S END 3,
5-6, 41 (1995) (describing the tenets of legal modernism as belief in rules of law that embody universal
truths, core essences, and foundational theories that provide for objective and consistent decisionmaking
to discover the “right answers” in every case).
40
Following the formalist remedial binary and ignoring the unified nature of right and remedy leads to
difficult decisions. For example, in the case of Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, the Court misdiagnosed
a case involving the failure to enforce a remedy as a case of substantive right. 545 U.S. 748, 125 S. Ct.
2796 (2005). The plaintiff sought damages under the Due Process Clause for the police department’s
repeated failure to enforce a restraining order against her husband. Id. at 2800. The failure ultimately led
to her ex-husband’s horrific murder of their three children. Id. at 2802. In divorcing right from remedy,
the Court was able to avoid addressing the impotence of an abstract right.
34
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B. A Balanced Measure of Justice
“Proportionality” is most easily understood to be a standard that requires the
judicial sanction to “fit” the legal harm.41 While no clear definition of proportionality
emerges from the Supreme Court cases, the basic meaning is balance or equilibrium.42
Proportionality addresses the measure, degree, or magnitude of the remedy and
prohibits extreme measures that do not fit the harm.43 Metaphorically, proportionality
holds that “one should not use a sledge hammer to crack a nut when a nutcracker will
suffice.”44 As explained in the Magna Carta, “a free man shall not be fined for a small
offence, except in proportion to the measure of offence; and for a great offence he shall
be fined in proportion to the magnitude of the offence.”45 The same concept appears
even earlier in the Code of Hammurabi and the Old Testament as the principle of lex
talionis—an eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth.46 Proportionality thus seeks the perfect
balance between right and remedy.
In the remedial context, proportionality generally is applied in a mechanical way
to require that a judicial remedy be properly related in size or degree to the wrong. The
decisionmaker searches for the precise balance between the defendant’s harm and the
plaintiff’s remedy in order to avoid excess, gain, or windfall on either side. Equilibrium
thus emerges as the hallmark of proportionality, evoking visions of the balanced scales
of justice.47 As Justice Scalia so aptly noted, it is the balanced scale, and not the
seesaw, that has come to serve as the icon of neutral and rational decisionmaking.48
Proportionality analysis at times resembles cost-benefit analysis, whereby the
court weighs the benefits and burdens between the parties. In this utilitarian sense,
proportionality searches for a proper fit or relationship between ends and means.49
41

Gunn, supra note 3, at 466.
See Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment:
“Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 573-74 (2004) (“Indeed, no clear definition
of proportionality can be found in any of the Court’s non-capital cases.”); Gunn, supra note 3, at 468
(“The word ‘proportionality’ has been adopted to encapsulate core values with broad implications, but
whose actual meaning can be maddeningly vague and even incoherent.”); accord Zoller, supra note 3, at
580.
43
See, e.g., BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575, 596, 600 (1996) (discussing the proportionality standard as
an assessment of the proper degree and measure of punitive damages); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res.
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 478 (1993) (citing case from 1813 addressing the moderate remedy “proper to the
magnitude and manner of that offence”) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
44
Gunn, supra note 3, at 466-67; Zoller, supra note 3, at 580 (noting the nutcracker metaphor of
proportionality in the British courts and the cannon metaphor from a Swiss jurist: “You must not shoot
sparrows with cannons.”).
45
Magna Carta, Art. 20.
46
See infra discussion at 44.
47
Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L. J. 263, 280 (2005)
(quoting Emmanuel Kant: “But what kind and what degree of punishment does justice take as its
principle and its norm? None other than the principle of equality in the movement of the pointer on the
scales of justice.”).
48
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1992).
49
Frase, supra note 42, at 595-97. Utilitarianism searches for the greatest happiness for the greatest
number, and thus will balance to incorporate the interests of all concerned. See Ristroph, supra note 47,
at 272.
42
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Costs and benefits are weighed by considering the gravity of the harm and the
alternative governmental responses. A governmental measure may be disproportionate
in a utilitarian sense when the measure’s costs and burdens outweigh the likely benefits,
or when the measure is more burdensome than some alternative means.50 However,
proportionality is a standard of judicial review “that is more elaborate and sophisticated,
but also more intrusive and aggressive, than the traditional means-end test.”51 Thus, it
may consider a range of other issues like federalism, institutional competencies, and the
appropriateness of judicial deference to other institutions.52
Theoretical notions of balance as justice are evident in legal theories ranging
from the very earliest to the most recent of times. Justice, as envisioned by both
Aristotle and law and economics theorists, focuses on balance as a proxy for fairness
and appropriate judicial action. Aristotle considered justice as a concept of balance
between the extremes of excess and deficiency that equalizes the positions of the
parties.53 Equality between the parties is determined by a “mean,” or intermediate state,
which lies between the extreme vices of deficiencies or excess.54 “Justice is a certain
kind of mean condition, . . . concerned with a mean quantity, while injustice is
concerned with extreme quantities.”55 Justice is thereby portrayed as a norm of fairness
achieved through a mathematical function.56 “What is just in transactions is something
equitable, . . . according to an arithmetic proportion.”57 Justice is accomplished by
finding the right mean between gain and loss that achieves an arithmetic ratio of one to
one.58 This arithmetic ratio of justice requires the judge to “even things up” by
adjusting unbalanced gain and loss into equal halves.59 “Whenever neither more nor
less results,” each party has what is justly theirs.60 Thus, Aristotle’s philosophy focuses
on striking a careful balance and equilibrium between the parties to achieve justice.
Excess or gain to either side is considered the antithesis of a just or fair result.61
Aristotle’s vision of corrective justice as a restoration of proportion between
parties after a wrong is one justification offered in support of the proportionality rule in
the area of compensatory damages.62 “Corrective justice theory is based on a simple
and elegant idea: when one person has been wrongfully injured by another, the injurer
50

Frase, supra note 42, at 595-97.
Zoller, supra note 3, at 571.
52
Gunn, supra note 3, at 466-67.
53
ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book V, Ch. 5 (Joe Saches, trans. 2002); see Sarah Cravens,
Judges as Trustees: A Duty to Account and an Opportunity for Virtue, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1637,
1642 (2005).
54
ARISTOTLE, supra note 53, Book V, Ch. 5, 1134a; see Ernst J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 403 (1992).
55
ARISTOTLE, supra note 53, Book V, Ch. 5, 1134a (“And injustice is the opposite in relation to what is
unjust, and this is excess and deficiency of what is beneficial or harmful, contrary to proportion.”).
56
Id. at 1132a; see Weinrib, supra note 54, at 404 (“In Aristotle’s account, fairness as a norm is
inseparable from equality as a mathematical function.”).
57
ARISTOTLE, supra note 53, Book V, Ch. 4, 1132a.
58
Id. at 1132al18-20.
59
Id. at 1132a25-32.
60
Id. at 1132bl13-15.
61
Id. at 1134al1-12.
62
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 17 (3d ed. 2002).
51
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must make the injured party whole.”63 The corrective justice principle of equilibrium,
sometimes referred to as the “rightful position,” requires that damages return the
plaintiff to the position she would have been but for the harm.64 To do less would leave
part of the harm unremedied, whereas doing more would confer a windfall gain to the
plaintiff.65 The bipolarity of corrective justice requires that the “defendant must pay not
just any amount, but the amount of the plaintiff’s injury, because the payment is not a
penalty per se, but the rectification of an injury that the defendant inflicted.”66
Theoretical support for a proportionality rule of remedies is also found in
modern law and economics. The Coase Theorem reduces the question of balance to a
level of bargaining between the parties.67 Parties should bargain freely to resolve legal
disputes based on economic efficiency. A rule of precise remedial measurement creates
incentives for defendants to act efficiently. The basic principle is that to achieve
appropriate remedial goals, “injurers should be made to pay for the harm their conduct
generates, not less, not more.”68 If the remedy is “higher or lower than the harm,
various undesirable social consequences will result.”69
If injurers pay less than for the harm they cause, underdeterrence may
result—that is, precautions may be inadequate, product prices may be too
low, and risk-producing activities may be excessive. Conversely, if
injurers are made to pay more than for the harm they cause, wasteful
precautions may be taken, product prices may be inappropriately high,
and risky but socially beneficial activities may be undesirably curtailed.70
Thus, the law should seek a perfect balance between parties to achieve economic
efficiency.
Balancing to achieve economic efficiency operates similarly in the context of
preliminary injunctions. “The traditional preliminary injunction rule employs a
balancing of irreparable harm designed to minimize expected error costs.”71 The court
compares “the harm to plaintiff if preliminary relief is erroneously denied and the harm
to defendant if preliminary relief is erroneously granted.”72 If there is an excess of harm
to plaintiff, the preliminary injunction will be granted. Prior to the entry of a final
judgment, “individual incentives to behave efficiently are distorted by uncertain legal

63

Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L. J. 695, 695 (2003).
LAYCOCK, supra note 62, at 17.
65
Id.
66
Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 63, at 701.
67
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see also RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 56-58 (5th ed. 1998).
68
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV.
869, 871 (1998).
69
Id. at 878.
70
Id.; see also POSNER, supra note 67, at 197-99.
71
Richard R.W. Brooks & Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the
Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 381, 396 (2005).
72
Id.; see John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 541 (1978).
64
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entitlements.”73 When rights are uncertain, parties discount the harm caused to others.74
Preliminary injunctions correct this distortion by counteracting the bias toward
infringement, realigning the balance to promote efficiency.75 Proportionality or
equivalence between the parties under the law creates the proper incentives for parties
to operate economically efficiently.
C.

The Three Bears Theory of Redress

The proportionality principle of remedies and its search for balance can be
thought of as the “Three Bears” theory of redress: the proper remedy is that which is not
too big, not too small, but just right. Like Goldilocks searching for the perfect bowl of
porridge, courts search for the perfect remedy by trying out different remedial choices.
This version of proportionality resonates with the Supreme Court, which has utilized it
as the guiding principle in deciding remedial questions over the past five years.
For example, in Kansas v. Colorado,76 Justices Thomas and Stevens used Three
Bears language to describe their dissenting opinions regarding the proper measure of
damages computed as prejudgment interest. The case, on its fourth appeal to the Court,
involved Colorado’s breach of the Arkansas River Compact beginning in 1950, and the
proper determination of the principal upon which prejudgment interest would be
computed.77 In a prior appeal, “Colorado attacked the award of any prejudgment
interest, while Kansas called for full prejudgment interest.”78 The Court adopted the
special master’s “equitable compromise,” awarding prejudgment interest beginning in
1985, when Colorado first filed its complaint.79 Kansas then sought post-1985 interest
computed upon all damages since 1950, which the Court dismissed as an attempt to
convert a “modest adjustment” of prejudgment interest into a windfall to the plaintiff.80
The majority thus held that prejudgment interest applied only to damages incurred after
1985.81 Justice Stevens dissented, stating that “[t]he fact that Kansas’ request represents
too large a measure of damages does not convince me that Kansas is entitled to no
interest for damages prior to 1985.”82 Justice Thomas, in a separate dissent, criticized
the Court for its “equitable compromise” of the past that created the further uncertainty
in the pending case: “The Court must again decide what is too little or too much
compensation for Colorado’s depletion of the Arkansas.”83
73

Id. at 382.
Id.
75
Id. at 393-94.
76
543 U.S. 86 (2004).
77
Id. at 90.
78
Id. at 96; see Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 14 (2001).
79
543 U.S. at 96.
80
Id. Kansas’ argument would have converted the $38 million damages into an award of $53 million.
81
Id. at 98.
82
Id. at 109 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens would have computed interest from 1969 forward,
representing the time Colorado knew, or should have known, it was violating the compact.
83
Id. at 107 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Thomas thought that no prejudgment
interest should be available because neither the contract nor the common law at the time of the contract
formation authorized such relief. Id. at 106.
74
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Justice Thomas utilized Three Bears reasoning again, this time writing for the
Court, in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC.84 In eBay, the Court overturned a
permanent injunction issued by the appellate court to protect a business-method patent
that defendant eBay had infringed on its successful auction website.85 The Court was
concerned that each party sought extreme positions as plaintiffs argued patent holders
were always entitled to equitable relief in addition to damages and defendants argued
injunctions were never appropriate.86 Thomas criticized the Federal Circuit for granting
too much relief by establishing a categorical rule under which patent holders were
always entitled to an injunction.87 He also chastised the district court for erring “in the
opposite direction” by awarding too little relief by holding that business-method patent
holders never need an injunction because they could always remedy their loss with
damages.88 The Supreme Court in eBay thus eschewed the “broad classifications” and
“expansive principles” at the far ends of the remedial spectrum, reiterating the
importance of balance between interests as necessary to determining the remedy that is
just right in each case.89
Three Bears reasoning appeared more subtly in the Court’s analysis of equitable
restitution.90 In Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, the Court, in a 5-4
decision, limited the Employee Retirement Income Security Act’s statutory
authorization of “equitable” relief to claims for constructive trust and equitable lien.91
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, used a historical approach to interpret
“equitable” in the text of the federal benefits statute to include only those equitable
remedies “typically available in equity . . . during the days of the divided bench.”92 The
effect of this decision was to preclude reimbursement to the company from its insured
for funds advanced for medical treatment and then later recovered by the insured from a
84

126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 1839. The American Bar Association in its amicus brief in eBay asked the high court to uphold
the Federal Circuit’s automatic rule for injunctions. See Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control, ABA J. 51, 53
(Sept. 2006).
88
eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840.
89
Id. at 1840-41. However, the remaining Justices indicated in two separate concurrences that they
differed on how that balance should be applied in the case. Chief Justice Roberts thought the balance
tipped in favor of the patent holders. Id. at 1841-42. Justice Kennedy thought the balance was in favor of
the company commercializing the process. Id. at 1842. For more on the eBay concurrences see
discussion infra at 28.
90
Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
91
Id. at 214. Justice Scalia admitted that “our cases have not previously drawn this fine distinction
between restitution at law and restitution in equity. . . .” Id.
92
Id. at 210, 212. See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s
Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003) (arguing that
Congress intended ERISA to incorporate the long history of trust remedy law authorizing reimbursement
actions); Tracy A. Thomas, Justice Scalia Reinvents Restitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1063 (2003)
[hereinafter Reinvents Restitution] (criticizing Scalia’s historical approach and creation of an unworkable
standard); Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. REV. 1577, 1616-22
(2002) (arguing that the Court incorrectly classified the relief requested as restitution, misread historical
practice, and suggesting that a claim for specific money in defendant’s possession like Great-West
brought was always equitable restitution).
85
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third-party tortfeasor.93 Scalia was not moved by pleas from the insurance company
that his narrow historical rule left plan providers with too little relief.94 Due to the
operation of federal preemption laws, the insurance company would be left with no
alternative remedy under state law, thus making standard insurance subrogation clauses
unenforceable.95 The Court’s restriction on the statutory remedial power was
motivated by the perception that the plaintiff insurance company was overreaching by
arguing for a definition of “equitable” relief that acted as a catchall provision for all
monetary relief.96 Justice Stevens, on the other hand, criticized the majority’s “current
reluctance to conclude that wrongs should be remedied.” 97
These cases thus demonstrate the machinations of balance inherent in the
proportionality standard. The proportionality rule seeks a precise balance between the
right and remedy as a proxy for fairness and justice. Applying this rule consistently and
clearly, however, has proved elusive.

II.

THE EVOLUTION OF REMEDIAL PROPORTIONALITY

A journey through the Supreme Court’s decisions since 2000 reveals a
mishmash of cases on remedies. These cases, addressing punitive damages, injunctions,
and legislative remedies, share a governing rule of proportionality, which the Court
applies to curtail the remedies available to courts and petitioners.98 As Professor
Andrew Siegel has noted, “the Court’s ire falls indiscriminately on those advocating for
the availability of a remedy.”99 This section explores the Court’s reasoning in remedial
proportionality decisions, and synthesizes the opinions to reveal the common principles
guiding proportionality analysis.
93

Id. at 208-09.
Id. at 220
95
Id. at 220-21. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343,
347-48 (2002) (“Some may not be greatly concerned about the inability of a benefits plan to enforce its
right to subrogation against a woman left quadriplegic by a serious accident. But as a result of this
decision, benefit plans under ERISA may in the future be reluctant to make payments to injured
individuals because of the uncertainty that subrogation rights will be enforceable.”).
96
Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210.
97
Great-West, 534 U.S. at 223. Justice Ginsburg also dissented, and joined by Justices Stevens, Souter
and Breyer, criticized the majority for its “antiquarian inquiry” that needlessly obscured the meaning and
application of the statute and which was “better left to the legal historians.” Id. at 224, 233-34. Four
years later, a unanimous Court in Sereboff v. Mid-Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., quietly reversed
positions and granted the insurance company the right to seek reimbursement. 126 S. Ct. 1869 (2006). In
a technical opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court authorized reimbursement for most insurance
companies by labeling the subrogation action as one for “equitable lien.” Id. at 1875. The Sereboff Court
did not address the conflict with its prior holding in Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, 525 U.S. 255,
264-65 (1999), that equitable liens are essentially actions for money and thus are “legal” rather than
equitable claims. See Thomas, Reinvents Restitution, supra note 72, at 1074 (addressing the
inconsistency between Great-West and Blue Fox).
98
Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the
Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1115, 117 (2006).
99
Siegel, supra note 101, at 1126.
94
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As initially applied by the Court, remedial proportionality was an outer limit
used to guard against extreme remedial measures or “gross disproportionality.”100 This
gross excessiveness standard was a variant of the “I know it when I see it” or “shocks
the judicial conscience” tests used to catch extreme remedial outliers.101 In Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, the Court’s first foray into federal substantive
review of state punitive awards, it applied a “gentle rule” of common-law
reasonableness to uphold a punitive award 200 times the amount of pecuniary
damages.102 The Court held that the award did not “cross the line into the area of
constitutional impropriety” because state law assured the jury award was not grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the offense or the compensatory damages.”103 Under
this “weak” remedial proportionality standard, the Court intervened sparingly to keep a
check on excessive remedies, but otherwise gave due deference to the decisionmaker’s
expertise and experience. Judicial review of remedies looked only for extreme
disproportionality that pushed the limits of legal redress.104
In contrast, the proportionality standard of the modern Court has emerged as a
heightened standard of judicial review that demands conformity to a precise remedial
measurement. Rather than cursory oversight to catch excessive remedies at the
periphery of reasonableness, modern proportionality affirmatively requires reviewing
courts to demand a more exact remedial fit. Borrowing from the Court’s terminology in
criminal punishment cases, this heightened review might be labeled “strict
proportionality” in that it demands a close fit between harm and remedy. The remedial
strict proportionality test requires a close nexus in both method and magnitude between
the governmental remedial action and operative legal right. That is, the court’s remedy
must correspond to the right in both type (method or subject) and amount (magnitude or
scope).
An early example of the development of the Court’s remedial proportionality
principle can be seen in City of Riverside v. Rivera.105 In Rivera, the plurality and the
concurring Justice Powell explicitly adopted a proportionality standard for assessing the
reasonableness of attorney fees in civil rights cases, requiring that fees be proportionate
to “the results” obtained in the case.106 This fee standard evaluates the magnitude of the
success, including equitable relief, and furtherance of the “public interest” in balancing
100

See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal
Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 903 (2004).
102
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 12, 20 (1991). In Haslip, the insureds sued their
insurance company for the fraud of its agent in pocketing payments for insurance that had lapsed. The
lead plaintiff, Haslip, recovered compensatory damages of $200,000, including $4,000 of pecuniary
damages for out-of-pocket losses for uninsured medical bills. Id. at 23.
103
Id. at 24.
104
See Karlan, supra note 104, at 903; see, e.g., TXO, 509 U.S. at 443; Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18; St. Louis,
Iron Mtn. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86,
111 (1909).
105
477 U.S. 561 (1986).
106
Rivera, 477 U.S. at 579; see Thomas H. McDonough, Recent Decisions, Civil Rights: Third Circuit
Disallows Use of Proportionality Analysis in Awarding Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the Federal Civil
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 449, 468 (1998).
101
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the reasonableness of the fees.107 Applying this standard, the Court upheld a fee award
of $245,456.25 in Rivera where the plaintiffs obtained only $33,350 in compensatory
and punitive damages108 because the successful race discrimination claim against the
police department advanced the public interest sufficiently to justify the award.109 Five
Justices expressly rejected the defendants’ request for a strict mathematical
proportionality formula that would have limited fees to $11,100, 33% of the monetary
recovery.110 The Court held that while it was concerned about potential windfalls to
plaintiffs’ attorneys, there were adequate safeguards in place to protect against such
excess.111 Thus, while the Court rejected a strict proportionality standard demanding a
close fit between fees and relief, it also moved away from a weak review of gross
excessiveness advanced by the plaintiffs. The Court thus began to demand heightened
judicial oversight measuring the scope of relief.
Reviewing the most recent Supreme Court cases on remedies demonstrates to a
striking degree how the Court has converted proportionality from a limited rule of
thumb to a universal standard of remedial measurement. The following section traces
the evolution of the proportionality standard through the Court’s most recent
pronouncements.
A. Mathematical Proportionality in Punitive Damages
Over the last decade, the Supreme Court has been newly troubled by state court
awards of punitive damages, finding them, in classic Three Bears fashion, to be simply

107

Rivera, 477 U.S. at 579. A similar standard appears in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PLRA), which requires that attorney fees be proportionate to the “court ordered relief” in the case. 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i). The PLRA thus eliminates from the proportionality rule consideration of the
advancement of the public interest, otherwise permitted by Rivera, and removes consideration of success
derived from private settlements. See Lynn S. Branham, Toothless In Truth? The Ethereal Rational
Basis Test and The Prison Litigation Reform Act's Disparate Restrictions On Attorney's Fees, 89 CAL. L.
REV. 999, 1010-11 (2001).
108
477 U.S. at 579. But see id. at 587 (Burger, J., dissenting) (“[I]t would be difficult to find a better
example of legal nonsense than the fixing of attorney's fees by a judge at $245,456.25 for the recovery of
$33,350 damages.”).
109
Id. at 579. However, Justice Powell, the concurring fifth Justice in the case, opined that:
Where recovery of private damages is the purpose of a civil rights litigation, a district
court, in fixing fees, is obligated to give primary consideration to the amount of
damages awarded as compared to the amount sought. In some civil rights cases,
however, the court may consider the vindication of constitutional rights in addition to
the amount of damages recovered. . . . It probably will be the rare case in which an
award of private damages can be said to benefit the public interest to an extent that
would justify the disproportionality between damages and fees reflected in this case.
Id. at 585, 586 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring). See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) (applying the
proportionality rule of attorney’s fees to strike down a fee of $280,000 in a case where the plaintiff
obtained only nominal damages of $1)
110
477 U.S. at 576, 580 (plurality opinion); id. at 585 (Powell, J., concurring).
111
Id. at 580. These adequate safeguards included a legal standard permitting only “reasonable” fee
awards, judicial discretion to deny fees in appropriate cases, and preclusion of fees incurred after a
pretrial settlement offer greater than the amount recovered at trial. Id. at 580-81.
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“just too big.”112 Punitive damages are a discretionary monetary remedy imposed to
punish a defendant’s unlawful conduct and to deter its repetition.113 The Court has
expressed concerns with “monstrous awards”114 of punitive damages that “run wild”115
or are “skyrocketing.”116 The Court is suspicious of state juries and their threat of
awarding punitives based on “prejudice, bias, and caprice” against big business.117 In
response, the Court has imposed a rule of proportionality to limit excessive punitive
awards.
This modern rule of strict, mathematical proportionality alters the longstanding
gross excessiveness standard to now require an affirmatively reasonable award, one that
is just right. In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, the Court discussed the common-law
standard from early English times that reviewed damages, both compensatory and
punitive, for “gross excessiveness,” looking for damages that were so “outrageous” that
“all mankind at first blush must think so.”118 The Oberg Court struck down an Oregon
state law that prohibited common-law judicial review and deferred solely to the jury.119
Since then, the Court’s federal oversight of state punitive awards has developed a more
demanding measure of punitive relief, requiring a court to pinpoint the precise measure
on the remedial spectrum that is “reasonable,” rather than merely striking down those
awards at the unreasonable extremes.120 The practical effect of this stricter standard is
to overturn more jury awards of punitive damages.
1.

Strict Proportionality for Punitives

112

See BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 600 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979); State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416
(2003); Gore, 517 U.S. at 569; Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991).
114
TXO, 509 U.S. at 473 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Rather than producing a judgment founded on
verifiable criteria, they produced a monstrous award – 526 times actual damages and over 20 times
greater than any punitive award in West Virginia history.”)
115
Gore, 517 U.S. at 598 (Scalia J., dissenting joined by Thomas, J.) (“Today we see the latest
manifestation of this Court's recent and increasingly insistent ‘concern about punitive damages that 'run
wild.'’"); TXO, 509 U.S. at 475 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18 (“We note once again
our concern about punitive damages that ‘run wild.’).
116
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco, 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part, joined by Stevens, J.); see also TXO, 509 U.S. at 500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“Recently, however, the frequency and size of such awards have been skyrocketing.”).
117
TXO, 509 U.S. at 492 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417 (“Jury instructions
typically leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts, and the presentation of evidence of a
defendant’s net worth creates the potential that juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big
businesses, particularly those without strong local presences.”).
118
512 U.S. 415, 421-22 (1994) (citing Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (CP 1763)); Karlan, supra
note 101, at 903 (identifying BMW v. Gore as “transforming the longstanding constitutional principle that
civil damages awards cannot be ‘grossly excessive’).
119
Oberg, 512 U.S. at 430.
120
Id. at 437 (Ginsberg, J. dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (arguing that the Constitution only
imposes an “outer limit on remedies” and does not guarantee a “right to a correct determination of the
reasonableness of a punitive award,” and noting that a violation of “reasonableness” does not establish
that the award is “grossly excessive.”).
113
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The Court’s proportionality rule for punitives requires that the measure of
punitive damages correspond to the wrongfulness of the conduct: “[C]ourts must
ensure that the measure of punishment is both reasonable and proportionate to the
amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered.”121
Proportionality is determined by use of “three guideposts,” directing judges to examine
the reprehensibility of the defendant’s action, the amount of harm caused, and the
societal indication of wrong embodied in other sanctions.122 The ultimate balance
between the harm caused and appropriate measure of punitives must satisfy a precise
mathematical ratio between compensatory and punitive damages.123
This proportionality rule demanding predictable computation of punitives is a
departure from the common-law theory that punitives should be indeterminate in order
to effectively punish or deter a defendant.124 The common-law theory ensured that
defendants could not calculate punitives into the cost of doing business and thereby
continue to engage in socially undesirable behavior. 125 Punitives internalize the costs
of reprehensible conduct where the market has failed to deter the rational economic
actor because the wrongdoing creates only external costs.126 Lack of predictability was
the true force behind punitive damages, because it prevented reprehensible conduct
from becoming a rational economic choice.
Courts traditionally reviewed punitive damages for extreme results falling at the
outer limits of reasoned judgment. Using a type of “I know it when I see it” approach,
courts looked to whether punitive awards “shocked the judicial conscience” or “jarred
constitutional sensibilities” in deciding whether to overturn the traditional deference to
the finders of fact.127 In the modern era, however, the Supreme Court has rejected this
longstanding norm of weak judicial oversight, and instead has adopted a rule of precise
measurement for punitive damages affirmatively mandating “reasonable” measures.
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Campbell, 538 U.S. at 426.
Id. at 418; BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
123
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424-25 (requiring that punitives be within a range of 2 to 9 times as large as
compensatory damages). See discussion infra at 20.
124
Cf. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 58-59 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (advocating proportionality for punitives and
rejecting argument that proper deterrence of corporate wrongdoing necessitates unpredictable and
disproportionate punitive awards from jury).
125
Man v. Raymark Indus., 728 F. Supp. 1461, 1467 (D. Haw. 1989) (“Punitive damages serve to deter
manufacturers as, unlike with compensatory damages, the defendant is prevented from making the
‘coldblooded calculation’ that it is more profitable to pay claims than correct a defect.”); Palmer v. A.H.
Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 218 (Colo. 1984) (“If punitive damages are predictably certain, they become
just another item in the cost of doing business, much like other production costs, and thereby induce a
reluctance on the part of the manufacturer to sacrifice profit by removing a correctible defect.”); see
Walter Lucas, Op-ed, Punitives Cap Makes Injury a Cost of Doing Business, 138 N.J. L.J. 789, 804
(1994); Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 1393, 1430 (1993).
126
Kevin S. Marshall & Patrick Fitzgerald, Punitive Damages and the Supreme Court’s Reasonable
Relationship Test: Ignoring the Economics of Deterrence, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 237, 251
(2005).
127
See TXO, 509 U.S. at 443 (plurality opinion); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
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Glimmers of a strict proportionality rule first appeared in 1993, in TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.128 In TXO, the plurality rejected the
parties’ request for an absolute test or mathematical bright line that would determine the
excessiveness of punitive awards.129 The Court rejected each side’s argument as too
extreme in Three Bears fashion, finding that the plaintiffs asked for too much in seeking
to uphold any punitive award that legitimately sought to punish or deter, and that
defendants sought too little relief in seeking to subject all punitives to heightened
scrutiny.130 Instead, the plurality adopted what has since been labeled a “narrow”
proportionality test under which it reviewed the punitive damages award for “gross
excessiveness.”131 The narrow proportionality standard does not mandate a particular
measure of punitive damages, but rather operates to strike down awards outside the
zone of reasonableness. Under this cursory check for excessiveness, a divided Court in
TXO upheld an award of $10 million in punitives for $19,000 in compensatory
damages.132 While the actual loss to the plaintiff was low, the Court found that the
potential loss threatened was several million dollars, and this potential harm, coupled
with the defendant’s egregious bad faith of bringing false lawsuits against innocent
business parties, made such an award reasonable.133
Justice O’Connor, however, criticized this weak standard of review and argued
for a more principled guide to lower courts as to the arbitrariness of punitive
damages.134 It was O’Connor’s dissent in TXO, joined by Justices White and Souter,
that raised the specter of proportionality for punitive damages.135 O’Connor argued that
the notion of proportionality was implicit in due process as the antithesis of arbitrary
state action.136 She observed that the “requirement of proportionality is ‘deeply rooted
and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence.’”137 Strict judicial review of
punitive damages, O’Connor said, ensured that the “ancient and fundamental principle
of justice is observed—that the punishment be proportionate to the offense.”138
The proportionality rule from O’Connor’s dissent emerged as the majority rule
just three years later in BMW v. Gore.139 With little explanation, the three split
128

509 U.S. 443 (1993).
Id. at 459.
130
Id. at 456.
131
Id. at 458.
132
Id. at 450, 456. Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality and its invocation of a narrow proportionality
standard, was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun. Justice Kennedy wrote a
concurrence criticizing the use of a quantitative rather than qualitative analysis for excessiveness. Id. at
466. Justices Scalia and Thomas, also concurring in the judgment upholding the award, rejected the
premise that the Constitution grants any power to the Supreme Court to review awards of punitive
damages. Id. at 470.
133
Id. at 462.
134
Id. at 480 (“In Solomonic fashion, the plurality rejects both petitioner's and respondents' proffered
approaches, instead selecting a seemingly moderate course. But the course the plurality chooses is, in
fact, no course at all.”).
135
Id. at 478-79 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
136
Id. at 479.
137
Id. at 478.
138
Id.
139
517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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opinions of TXO combined to form a rule endorsing a strict proportionality standard for
punitive damages incorporating both qualitative and quantitative factors.140 In Gore,
the plaintiff was awarded $2 million dollars for BMW’s fraud of selling a car as new,
failing to disclose it had been repainted.141 The plaintiff’s damages from the fraud were
$4,000, the amount of the reduced market value of a “used” car.142 The Court reacted to
the plaintiff’s windfall for such an inconsequential economic harm by adopting the
“three guideposts” to guide the courts’ decisions as to a proper measure of punitive
damages: punitives must be proportional to 1) the reprehensibility of the defendant’s
misconduct; 2) the amount of compensatory damages awarded; and 3) the amount of
other civil sanctions.143 In Gore, like TXO, disproportionality between punitives and
the amount of harm indicated that the judge should “rais[e] a suspicious eyebrow.”144
While the Court found it important to adopt a new, heightened standard of
proportionality in Gore, the result did not depend upon this standard. Gore was an easy
case, as Justice Breyer explained:
[T]he severe disproportionality between the award and the legitimate
punitive damages objectives reflects a judgment about a matter of
degree. I recognize that it is often difficult to determine just when a
punitive award exceeds an amount reasonably related to a State’s
legitimate interests, or when that excess is so great as to amount to a
matter of constitutional concern. Yet whatever the difficulties of
drawing a precise line, once we examine the award in this case, it is not
difficult to say that this award lies on the line’s far side. The severe lack
of proportionality between the size of the award and the underlying
punitive damages objectives shows that the award falls into the category
of “gross excessiveness” set forth in the Court’s prior cases. 145
Nonetheless, the Court emerged from Gore with a stricter standard of
proportionality requiring the Court to choose a more precise point along the remedial
spectrum as to reasonable relief. Rather than merely identifying an award as so severe
and oppressive as to fall within the zone of arbitrariness as had been done in the past,146
courts were now instructed to more closely approximate a “reasonable” measure of
punitive damages. Subsequently, the Court adopted a de novo standard of review for
punitive awards in order to facilitate the exacting inquiry needed to apply strict
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Justice O’Connor’s position in TXO quietly won the day as her dissent and Kennedy’s concurrence in
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Gore, 517 U.S. at 567.
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State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003); Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.
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Gore, 517 U.S. at 583; TXO, 509 U.S. at 481 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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146
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proportionality and avoid the more deferential narrow proportionality standard of
outlying excessiveness.147
In 2003, the Court refined the strict proportionality standard as a mathematical
ratio in State Farm v. Campbell.148 In State Farm, the Court overturned an award of
punitive damages in the amount of $145 million for State Farm’s bad faith and
intentional infliction of emotional distress against one of its insureds.149 State Farm
covered up the liability of its insured in a fatal car accident, refused to settle for the
policy limits, and then threatened its own insured, the Campbells, with bankruptcy and
losing their home.150 The Court identified the legal problem in the case as the
“imprecise manner” of measuring punitive damages.151 The six-Justice majority had
“no doubt that there is a presumption against an award that has a 145 to 1 ratio.”152
In the past, the Court had consistently rejected pressure to set a concrete
mathematical formula for the proper measure of punitives.153
Of course, we have consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional
line is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one that
compares actual and potential damages to the punitive award. . . . We
need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line
between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally
unacceptable that would fit every case.154
Nevertheless, in State Farm the Court identified a range of concrete ratios of
appropriate proportional measures of punitive damages.155 The Court suggested that
“single-digit” multipliers of damages are more likely to comport with due process, and
that ratios of 4 to 1 were generally defensible.156 It also noted with favor a long
legislative history of adopting ratios of double, triple, or quadruple damages.157 Thus,
punitives were largely restricted to 2 to 9 times the amount of compensatory damages
awarded in a case.158
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State Farm, like Gore, was “neither close nor difficult.”159 The application of a
narrow proportionality standard of gross excessiveness would have sufficed to
invalidate the extreme punitive award. Nevertheless, the Court took the opportunity to
craft a more stringent standard of proportionality necessitating a careful assessment of
punitive damages. The concern with precise, careful measurement and close
quantitative nexus are all indicative of a strict proportionality standard.
2.

Proportionality as a Constitutional Mandate for Fairness

The Supreme Court has located the requirement of proportionality for punitive
damages in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.160 The Court has
expressly stated that both procedural and substantive due process guarantees are
implicated in an excessive punitive award.161 The Due Process Clause prohibits the
imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments: “The reason is that
elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that
a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment,
but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”162 Grounding
proportionality in constitutional notions of fairness has potentially broad implications,
as all remedies, not just punitives, may be said to require constitutionally fair results.163
Excessive punitive awards are unfair to defendants, according to the Court,
because they fail procedurally to provide adequate notice to the defendant of the rule of
law.164 A proportionality rule thus promotes consistency in awards and provides the
constitutionally-required notice of the potential legal consequences of reprehensible
conduct.165 Excessive punitives are also unfair to defendants in the arbitrariness of the
amount of the award.166 Proportionality reins in excess and avoids arbitrary
governmental action that violates substantive due process. Conceptualized as a due
Matthias v. Accor Lodging Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (discussing the economic bases
for deviating from a strict mathematical ratio for punitives).
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Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418; Gore, 517 U.S. at 596 (Breyer, J., concurring).
160
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416; Cooper, 532 U.S. at 433-34; Gore, 517 U.S. at 559; TXO, 509 U.S. at 443.
But see A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages: The Error of Federal Excessiveness
Jurisprudence, 79 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1085 (2006) (arguing that the Court’s proportionality rule for
punitives has no basis in the Due Process Clause).
161
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416. Not all Justices, however, agree that the Constitution embodies this
proportionality principle. Id. at 429 (Scalia., J., and Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg
additionally argues that proportionality review is an unjustified intrusion into the province of the state
governments and thus is not sanctioned by the Constitution. Gore, 517 U.S. at 607; accord id. at 598
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416.
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See Tracy A. Thomas, Restriction of Tort Remedies and the Constraints of Due Process: The Right to
an Adequate Remedy, 39 AKRON L. REV. 975 (2006) [hereinafter Tort Remedies] (arguing that the Due
Process Clause requires a floor of a minimally adequate measure of tort damages for plaintiffs); Mark
Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1093, 1093-94 (2005) (endorsing expanded
substantive due process review to limit tort damages); accord Paul DeCamp, Beyond State Farm: Due
Process Constraints on Noneconomic Compensatory Damages, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231 (2003).
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Id. at 417.
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Gore, 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416.
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process issue, proportionality becomes a tool used to prevent encroachment on
individual rights.167
The individual right at issue is the property interest of the defendant.168 Of
prime concern is when the property interest of the defendant is used to create a windfall
for the plaintiff. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in State Farm, was
particularly troubled by the potential duplication of awarding both punitives and
emotional distress damages: “Much of the distress was caused by the outrage and
humiliation the Campbells suffered at the actions of their insurer; and it is a major role
of punitive damages to condemn such conduct. Compensatory damages, however,
already contain this punitive element.”169 In other words, a plaintiff’s emotional
indignation and the defendant’s reprehensible conduct are merely two sides of the same
coin: one (the distress) is simply the reaction to the other act (the reprehensible
conduct). Thus, the Court intimates that damages based on the intentional infliction of
emotional distress already compensate for the defendant’s wrongful act.170
Ultimately, the Court is concerned about the constitutional rights of the
defendants, particularly those of big corporate defendants that might bear the brunt of
jurors’ animosity and bias. The excessive size of many punitive awards, the Court
states, can be “explained by the jury’s raw, redistributionist impulses stemming from
antipathy to a wealthy, out-of-state corporate defendant.”171
Corporations are mere abstractions and, as such are unlikely to be
viewed with much sympathy. Moreover, they often represent a large
accumulation of productive resources; jurors naturally think little of
taking an otherwise large sum of money out of what appears to be an
enormously larger pool of wealth. Finally, juries may feel privileged to
correct perceived social ills stemming from unequal wealth distribution
by transferring money from “wealthy” corporations to comparatively
needier plaintiffs.172
The Court justifies its concern for corporate wrongdoers as economically based,
finding that a corporation’s “status as an active participant in the national economy
implicates the federal interest in preventing individual States from imposing undue
167
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burdens on interstate commerce.”173 Among other concerns, Justice O’Connor noted
how the threat of enormous punitive damage awards has a detrimental effect on the
research and development of new products.174 These national concerns, as well as
concerns under the fairness guarantees of the Due Process Clause, thus weigh in favor
of protecting defendants from untoward remedial consequences.
B.

Reining in Injunctions

In the context of injunctions, proportionality again operates to limit the remedial
power of the court. Proportionality is explained as a mechanism to rein in the expansive
power of lower court outlaws who engage in judicial policymaking through broad
injunctive relief. The proportionality principle manifests itself as a doctrinal rule
requiring that the scope of the injunction match the scope of the harm.175
Proportionality for injunctive relief, the Court has stated, derives from the inherent
concept of fairness embodied in equity that balances all of the interests in a remedial
calculation.176 However, proportionality is a one-way street: it is used to protect
defendants against disproportionate remedies, but plaintiffs do not receive comparable
protection.
1. Developing Standards of Proportionality
As with punitive damages, proportionality for injunctions has evolved from
weak oversight to a strict standard of review. The Court developed its rule of
proportionality for injunctions in the school desegregation cases.177 Law professors
summarizing these cases view the structural injunctions as “the most untailored remedy
imaginable”178 and assumed that the Court had abandoned any effort to cabin equitable
173
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remedial discretion within the right-remedy proportionality nexus.179 What was at play,
however, was a weak proportionality standard under which the Court cursorily reviewed
lower court injunctions for excess. The Court utilized a weak proportionality or “rightremedy” standard which gave great weight to the lower court’s factfinding expertise and
determination of a fair remedy.180 Under this weak standard, most, but not all, of the
school desegregation case challenges were upheld.181
The watershed change in the application of the proportionality standard for
injunctions came in Missouri v. Jenkins.182 The four dissenting Justices, led by Justice
Souter, struggled to retain the weak proportionality standard under which injunctions
would be reviewed only for “exceptional circumstances” or “obvious error.”183 The
majority, however, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist adopted a stronger
proportionality standard under which it overturned the lower court injunction, ordering
salary increases for school personnel and state funding for remedial achievement
programs.184 Justice Thomas, concurring in Jenkins, revealed the extent to which the
Court’s holding departed from its past application of weak proportionality in the
injunction context. He argued that remedial decrees had gotten out of hand, and that
“the time has come for us to put the genie back in the bottle.”185 Thomas argued that
the Court should “demand that remedial decrees be more precisely designed” to avoid
the type of “hit-or-miss method” of shaping remedies that had been employed in the
past.186 This demand for a reasonable, carefully tailored remedy signaled the advent of
strict remedial proportionality. Applying this strict standard, it appears that defendants
usually win.
2. The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
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In the new millennium, the injunctive proportionality tale told by the Supreme
Court is a story of good defendants, bad overreaching plaintiffs, and ugly overzealous
courts. In this narrative, plaintiffs, often aided by the courts, reach for the moon,
seeking social justice and windfall gains at the expense of overtaxed defendants.
Concerns about the consequences of the injunction for the defendants, who are more
often than not institutional actors, drive the decisions. Inverting the normal balance of
plaintiffs deserving vindication from wrongdoing defendants, these cases portray
proportionality as a tool to restore justice for defendants.
The Good: Overburdened Defendants: Remedial injunctive proportionality
cases are striking due to the Court’s concern for the interests of the established
wrongdoer. The individual freedom of the defendants emerges as a key factor in
measuring the appropriate proportion of injunctive relief. The theoretical origins of
such a heightened standard are left unstated. Perhaps it is merely a doctrinal leftover
from the First Amendment overbreadth context. Proportionality for injunctions
originated in the prior restraint cases of overbreadth, in which the Court sought to
protect the First Amendment rights of the defendant.187 Perhaps it is the unique status
of injunctive relief which operates prospectively to restrict the future freedom of the
defendant. The restriction on behavior that may or may not be illegal, the potential for
contempt penalties, and the possible curtailment of defendants’ otherwise efficient
behavior may counsel in favor of respecting their interests in the remedial calculus.188
The Court’s explanation for its heightened standard is based on pragmatic
concerns for the institutional actors who serve as defendants in these cases. At times
this institutional concern manifests as practical management issues governing the
expertise of the defendant in handling the day-to-day affairs of the institution.189 At
other times the institutional concern is translated as one of federalism, both horizontal
and vertical, when courts assume responsibilities granted to another branch of
government.190 It is clear that the Court is reluctant to direct the activities of
institutional and corporate defendants, despite their proven wrongdoing.
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The Court began to develop this tale of the good defendant in the school
desegregation cases.191 In these cases, it began to establish the doctrinal rules
embodying the juridicial concern for defendants. Under these rules, defendants are
given the first opportunity to remedy the harm or to craft an appropriate remedial
plan.192 If the defendants fail in that voluntary effort, then the court must weigh
carefully the interests of the institutional defendants in managing their own affairs in the
remedial process.193 For example, in Lewis v. Casey, the detailed prison law library
injunction failed not just because it was overbroad, but also because it failed to accord
proper deference to the judgment of prison administrators and to give them a first
opportunity to correct their errors.194
Modern cases of remedial proportionality in injunctions demonstrate continued
deference to defendants and a heightened concern for their interests. For example, in
Sherrill, the Court highlighted the interests of the city from whom the Oneida tribe was
seeking tax immunity as a basis for denying the injunctive relief.195 The Court was
concerned about the impact of a contrary decision upon the city, which had relied upon
the non-Indian status of the land for more than 200 years, building its city, developing
its zoning, and relying upon the tax base.196 Technically, the Court effectuated this
concern through the doctrinal vehicle of laches, reasoning that New York’s two
centuries of continuous regulatory jurisdiction created “justifiable expectations” on the
part of the city, buttressed by the Oneida’s delay in asserting their claims: “The long
history of state sovereign control precludes the Oneida from rekindling embers of
sovereignty that long ago grew cold.”197 The majority stated that allowing tax
immunity for the Oneida’s parcels would “seriously burden the administration of state
and local governments and would adversely affect landowners neighboring the tribal
patches.”198 The Court framed this as an “impracticality” defense to the injunction,
finding that it was impractical to return to Indian control land that generations earlier
passed into numerous private hands.199
Similarly, in Ayotte, the Court relied upon the interests of the defendant to deny
the broad injunction.200 The proportionality calculus was driven by the Court’s
overriding concern for the institutional defendant, the New Hampshire legislature. It
identified “three interrelated principles informing its decision,” all of which pertained to
the defendant.201 First, the Court stated, it tries not to nullify more of a legislature’s
191
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work than is necessary, for such a ruling frustrates the intent of the elected
representatives of the people.202 Second, the Court attempts to avoid devising a judicial
remedy that essentially rewrites state law, “mindful that our constitutional mandate and
institutional competence are limited.” 203 It held that such remedial “line-drawing” was
“inherently complex” and a “serious invasion of the legislative domain.”204 Third, the
Court held that the “touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative intent, for a
court cannot use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature.”205
Ultimately, the Court viewed its most important remedial restraint as the proper respect
of a federal court for the institutional functioning of the state legislature, despite the
unconstitutional actions of that legislature.
The Bad: Overreaching Plaintiffs: The second character in the Court’s tale of
injunctive proportionality is the overreaching plaintiff. The Court is often explicit in
stating its belief that plaintiffs overreach by requesting excess relief. Such excess relief
produces windfalls to plaintiffs or society beyond what justice requires. The doctrinal
rule that an injunctive remedy return a plaintiff to the position she would have occupied
in the absence of the defendant’s illegal conduct restricts the plaintiff’s ability to receive
a remedial windfall.206 Plaintiffs are not to obtain an advantage in excess of this
position, nor is the remedy to benefit third parties not harmed by the conduct at issue.
Beyond this mechanical doctrinal rule, however, lies a greater suspicion of plaintiffs
and a distrust of their motivations in the litigation.207
For example, underlying the Court’s decision in Jenkins, in which it struck down
an overbroad school desegregation degree, was a belief in the suspect motives of some
of the parties. The Court noted the collusion between the parties and the school district
in using the litigation to leverage funding for improved education. The school district
initially filed as a plaintiff along with the parents, though it was later realigned as a
nominal defendant. “The KCMSD, which has pursued a ‘friendly adversary’
relationship with the plaintiffs, has continued to propose ever more expensive
programs.”208 The Court accused the parties of bypassing the normal process of
collective bargaining by colluding in the litigation to obtain higher salaries funded by
the state.209
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This collusion led the plaintiffs to continually seek “extravagant,” “elaborate”
programs designed to obtain one of the best public educations in the nation.210 The
plaintiffs obtained public schools with air conditioning, a planetarium, greenhouses, a
model United Nations room, an art gallery, an animal farm, and movie screening
rooms.211 “The District Court candidly has acknowledged that it has ‘allowed the
District planners to dream and provide the mechanism for those dreams to be
realized.’”212 This overreaching was clearly beyond the pale and triggered the
conclusion of disproportionate relief.
The same belief in the corrupt motives of overreaching plaintiffs guided Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay.213 Plaintiff MercExchange won $35 million in
damages after a jury trial for eBay’s infringement of its business method patent in
creating the eBay on-line auction company.214 MercExchange then sought an injunction
prohibiting eBay’s use of the patent in the future.215 The parties had previously tried to
reach a licensing agreement permitting eBay’s use of the on-line method, but were
unsuccessful.216
Four concurring justices wrote separately to express concerns over the the
potential overreaching of the plaintiff.217 These Justices identified the plaintiff as one of
a new breed of “patent trolls,” who seek to enforce a patent in area where it does not
actively compete with a product or process.218 In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy
recognized that “[a]n industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis
for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”219
He expressed concerns about a remedial rule that created windfalls to these plaintiffs in
cases where the patent was only a business method patent, and “when the patented
invention is but a small component of the product the defendant company seeks to
produce.”220 For in these cases, the “injunction is employed simply for undue leverage
in negotiations” by threatening to close down the defendant’s entire business.221 For
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216
The district court noted the acrimony between the parties, commenting that ‘this case has been one of
the more, if not the most, contentious cases that this court has ever presided over.” MercExchange, 275
F. Supp. 2d at 714.
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Id. at 1843 (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Stevens, J., Souter, J., and Breyer, J.).
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See Seidenberg, supra note 64, at 51, 53. A “patent troll” is a “nefarious term for businesses that
produce no products or services and have the sole purpose of obtaining money by licensing patents they
own and winning infringement lawsuits against others.” The term was first used in 2001 by in-house
counsel for Intel Corp. to describe the small companies that were suing Intel for patent infringement. Id.
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eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
220
Id.; see Seidenberg, supra note 64, at 54.
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eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1842; see Seidenberg, supra note 64, at 54. However, the flip side of this concern
with overreaching is the recognition that many “patent trolls” are small inventors whose methods and
processes have been appropriated by large companies like Microsoft and Intel. Seidenberg, supra, at 5154. Small inventors often enter into negotiations with large companies to license their inventions. When
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Kennedy, this misuse of injunctive relief to garner excessive power in the economic
arena militated against the issuance of injunctions to future patent trolls.222
The character of the overreaching plaintiff appears again in Sherrill.223 The
Oneida Indian tribe brought a series of cases over several decades trying to reclaim
ancient tribal lands wrongfully taken by the government. In a prior decision, the
Supreme Court held that the tribe had a right to assert damages as compensation for
lands wrongfully taken.224 Subsequently, the Oneida sought tax immunity for several
parcels of land the tribe had reacquired from private owners on the open market. One
senses that the Court thought the Indian tribe was seeking more than its fair share of
relief by following a successful bid for damages on a novel claim with yet another
request for prospective relief. The Oneida had gone one step too far, and the Court
would no longer be a willing player in the claim for restorative justice more properly
addressed in the legislative arena.225 The lone dissenter in Sherrill, Justice Stevens,
challenged the notion of the excessive plaintiff, stating that “the majority’s fear of
opening a Pandora’s box of tribal powers is greatly exaggerated.”226 He pointed out the
inconsistency of previously recognizing the Oneidas as the owners of the land, and their
attendant right to collect damages for that land, but not permitting them to assert
injunctive relief as owners of the same land.227 The majority, however, drew a line,
permitting legal but not equitable relief to prevent an excessive award to the tribe.
The Ugly: Overzealous Courts: As the narrative continues, the Supreme Court
rides in with its white hat of remedial proportionality to save us all from the tyranny of
overzealous courts. In this tale, the lower courts are the ugly villains who inflict harm
with their remedial weapons, using their remedial powers for purposes other than to
make the plaintiff whole. The rule of proportionality thus becomes a restriction of the
equitable power of the courts, rather than a mere balancing of the equities between the
parties. It is a rule of restraint limiting the remedial authority of the lower courts.
The assumption of the overzealous court gone astray is clear in Jenkins, where
the majority takes the lower court to task for its indulgence in designing plaintiffs’
wish-list relief. The Court commented that the lower court’s injunction had been
described as the “most ambitious and expensive remedial program in the history of
school desegregation.”228 It found that the excessive relief awarded—such as a
negotiations break down, the large company proceeds to use the new technology without a license, and
the small inventor is left with no intellectual property and the high-cost of patent litigation. Id.
222
eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1842.
223
544 U.S. 197 (2005).
224
See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 231(1985).
225
The availability of an alternative remedy in a federal process for placing Indian land in federal trust
mitigated the Court’s seemingly harsh decision. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 20-21. The Oneida did not
pursue this option, but nevertheless found relief in subsequent proceedings when on remand, the tribe
won tax immunity under New York state law that precluded taxation of tribal property owners. See
Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison County, 401 F. Supp. 2d 219, 232 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
226
Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 227 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Stevens found the Court’s legalistic distinction based on law and equity to be unpersuasive. Id. at 22526.
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Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 78.
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planetarium and a United Nations room—to encourage public school attractiveness and
counteract white flight was judicial policymaking rather than proper remedial
decisionmaking.229 As Justice O’Connor articulated in her concurrence, “[t]he
necessary restrictions on our jurisdiction and authority contained in Article III of the
Constitution limit the judiciary’s institutional capacity to prescribe palliatives for
societal ills. . . . It is best to leave social problems like education and segregation to the
legislative branches.”230
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, was more direct in his attack on the
lower court.231 He urged the adoption of a proportionality rule to restrain such
unacceptable use of judicial authority.
It is perhaps not surprising that broad equitable powers have crept into
our jurisprudence for they vest judges with the discretion to escape the
constraints and dictates of the law and legal rules. But I believe that we
must impose more precise standards and guidelines on the federal
equitable power . . . to restore predictability to the law and reduce
judicial discretion.232
Justice Thomas situated the factual debate in the larger critique of lower court
activism, arguing that courts had more generally veered from the narrow course of
remedying wrongs.233 Challenging all structural and public law relief as improper, this
larger criticism reprimands courts for assuming the role of legislatures by essentially
enacting policy through the award of broad injunctive relief extending beyond the
contours of the case.234 The theory exemplified by Thomas’ dissent is a federalist
critique asserting that courts usurp legislative authority by making policy through the
use of remedial authority. It takes on legal theorists like Professors Fiss and Chayes,
who in the 1970s argued that the courts should disconnect right from remedy in order to
implement moral justice through remedial power and structural injunctions.235 Fiss and
Chayes argued for remedies that were broader than the legal right in order to elaborate
and instill new legal norms of social justice. The federalist critique attacks the ability of
229

Id. at 83 (quoting the dissenting appellate judge’s conclusion that the case “involves an exercise in
pedagogical sociology, not constitutional adjudication.”).
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Id. at 112-13.
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Id. at 125 (Thomas, J., concurring). Thomas stated: “The judicial overreaching we see before us today
perhaps is the price we now pay for our approval of such extraordinary measures in the past. . . . Judges
have directed or managed the reconstruction of entire institutions and bureaucracies with little regard for
the inherent limitations on their authority.” Id. at 125-56.
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Id. at 135.
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Id. at 131-33 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of
Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978) and Paul Mishkin, Federal Courts as State
Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949 (1978)).
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See, e.g., John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of
the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1996) (“[T]he essential flaw of judicial management is
that the Constitution does not permit the federal courts to exercise their remedial powers to engage in the
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See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976);
Fiss, supra note 177, at 1.
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lower courts to award any type of structural relief beyond correcting the specific past
harm.236 Proportionality thus has become a doctrinal rule to discredit public law
injunctions and implement a policy against alleged judicial activism.
This same attack on overzealous courts has appeared as a motivating factor
guiding proportionality analysis in recent cases in the Supreme Court. For example, in
eBay, the Court chastised the Federal Circuit for altering the centuries-old doctrinal rule
of balancing the interests to determine injunctive relief.237 The Federal Circuit asserted
its authority to prioritize patent rights above other legal rights by adopting a categorical
rule of always granting injunctive relief to patent holders. Such zeal was quickly
curtailed by a unanimous Court, which focused on the appellate court’s inappropriate
assertion of power and authority.238
The critique of a lower court also dominates the Court’s decision in the
infamous case of Bush v. Gore.239 In Bush, the Court struck down the Florida Supreme
Court’s remedy for the undercounting of votes in a presidential election where the
Florida court ordered the manual recount of votes in designated counties.240 The Court
found the injunctive remedy to be both arbitrary and disproportional.241 It also reacted
to the Florida Supreme Court’s zealous assertion of remedial power. As Professor
Andrew Siegel surmises, the Justices in the majority “took note of the fact that in
addition to simply taking jurisdiction over this crucial national issue, the Florida
Supreme Court had also cheerfully taken up the role of equitable umpire, vesting itself
with the power to craft ad hoc remedial solutions to a problem the legislature had not
fully contemplated.”242 In a vigorous dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
236

See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 133 (Thomas, J., concurring); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996)
(Scalia, J.) (asserting that the actual injury requirement of standing generally limits injunctions to the
injury in fact).
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126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2005).
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Id.; see id. at 1841-42 (Roberts, C.J. concurring) (agreeing with the rejection of an automatic grant of
injunction, but arguing that plaintiff patent holders were historically granted such requests for injunctive
relief).
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531 U.S. 98 (2000). See Siegel, supra note 98, at 1181-82. Professor Siegel argues that while Bush v.
Gore might be explained by some of the Justices’ initial animosity to the political result of the Florida
Court’s decision, there was also “something deeper and more visceral at work.” Id. at 1181. The Court
displayed, “a fundamental hostility toward the role of the Florida Supreme Court took upon itself. . . .
[T]he majority Justices likely saw a lower court advocating the primacy of a litigation solution to a
contentious public debate.” Id.
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Bush, 531 U.S. at 111.
241
The Court found the recount remedy to be arbitrary because it failed to adopt uniform standards for
designating a valid legal vote. Id. at 106. It found the remedy to be disproportional because it ordered
recounts for overvotes (those ballots for which two votes were made) when the established legal violation
addressed undervotes (those votes placed that were not tabulated by the machines). Id. at 107-09. But
see Tracy A. Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic Remedies Through the Looking Glass of Bush v.
Gore, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 343, 388-98 (2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s suggested
remedy of requiring detailed safeguards for the recount and changes in the voting laws was
disproportional).
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Siegel, supra note 98, at 1182. “For many—perhaps most – Justices throughout our history, the role
assumed by the Florida justices might not have seemed extraordinary. But for the five Justices who drove
the tempo and timbre of the Rehnquist Court agenda, the Florida Supreme Court’s embrace of such a role
was a provocative act, one guaranteed to raise their hackles.” Id.
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Ginsburg and Breyer, argued that the majority’s distrust of the remedial power of lower
courts threatened the rule of law:
What must underlie petitioners’ entire federal assault on the Florida
election procedures is an unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality
and capacity of the state judges who would make the critical decisions if
the vote count were to proceed. . . . The endorsement of that position by
the majority of this Court can only lend credence to the most cynical
appraisal of the work of judges throughout the land. It is confidence in
the men and women who administer the judicial system that is the true
backbone of the rule of law. . . . Although we may never know with
complete certainty the winner of this year’s Presidential election, the
identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation’s confidence in the
judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.243
Bush v. Gore is thus another example where the remedial balance of proportionality was
skewed by the perception of the implementing court as not deserving of credit for
effectuating justice. The Florida court was undeserving of deference because of its
attempt to control a national election beyond the contours of its state power.
The most recent U.S. Supreme Court cases on injunctive relief thus reveal
prevalent judicial concerns for defendants and the potential consequences of
disproportionate awards of injunctive relief. Seeking a balance between the plaintiff’s
deficiency and the potential excess, the Court has tilted the balance in favor of
respecting defendants’ interests in the computation of judicial redress. Factoring in a
distrust for overzealous courts, the Supreme Court has been vigilant in strictly
scrutinizing the injunctive relief developed by these courts, rather than according them
traditional deference under a weak proportionality standard. This same use of strict
remedial proportionality appears in the Court’s cases addressing legislative remedies
enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. Congruent and Proportional Legislative Remedies Under Section 5
Statutory remedies enacted by Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment offer another example of the Court’s move towards remedial
proportionality. Section 5 provides that Congress may “enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions” of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Court has defined this
to be only a limited “remedial,” rather than general substantive power.244 The scope of
these legislative remedies has been determined by the Court to parallel that of judicial
remedies, and thus these Section 5 remedies add to the remedial story told by the cases
on punitive damages and injunctions previously discussed.245 Searching for the
243
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measure of appropriate relief under Section 5, the Court has adopted a principle of
proportionality to gauge the proper scope of remedial legislation, requiring that the
legislation exhibit “congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented
or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”246 A “congruent and proportional”
legislative remedy is one that demonstrates congruence between the means used and the
ends to be achieved, and is not “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior.”247 Using this balancing framework, the Court reviews
Section 5 legislation to make sure it is appropriately tailored and not excessive. As
discussed below, the proportionality review is built upon a distrust of Congress and the
perceived threat to the Court’s ultimate power to define the constitutional law.

1.

A Series of Disproportionate Events

In six cases over five years, the Supreme Court uniformly struck down Section 5
legislation in every case it reviewed, consistently finding that the congressional actions
at issue were disproportionate to the targeted harm.248 Congress’ failure to target its
prophylactic legislation at an identified constitutional right proved to be the downfall of
the legislation in most of these cases.249 Congress seemed to be resisting the remedial
Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 9, at 469. Many legal scholars have criticized the Court’s adoption
of a remedial standard for Section 5, arguing for a broader legislative power. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.,
NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 148 (2002) (arguing
that Section 5 should not be equated with judicial power since the Fourteenth Amendment assigns no
enforcement role to the Court); Ruth Colker, The Supreme Court’s Historical Errors in City of Boerne v.
Flores, 43 B.C. L. REV. 783 (2000) (claiming that the Supreme Court made significant historical errors in
interpreting Section 5 as a remedial rather than interpretive authority); James W. Fox, Jr., Re-readings
and Misreadings: Slaugher-House, Privileges or Immunities, and Section Five Enforcement Power, 91
KY. L.J. 67 (2002) (tracing the history of Section 5 to suggest a source of broad interpretive power); Evan
H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127
(2001) (arguing that Section 5 should be interpreted according to tests for general Article I power).
246
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
247
Id. at 532.
248
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Violence Against Women Act); Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (Trademark Remedy Clarification Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank., 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
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For example, in City of Boerne, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was invalidated because it
targeted the non-constitutional harms of zoning, land-use, and fair housing laws. 521 U.S. at 521. In
Morrison, Congress misdirected its legislative aim when it sought to remedy the common-law assault
claims of domestic violence lacking constitutional protection. 529 U.S. at 625-26. And in both Garrett
and Kimel, Congress targeted employment practices not prohibited by the federal Constitution. 531 U.S.
at 366-72; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91; see College Savings, 527 U.S. at 674 (invalidating Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act because Congress attempted to remedy the non-constitutional, common torts of unfair
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contours of its designated power by attempting to redefine substantive constitutional
rights.
The development of a proportionality principle in the Section 5 context was thus
guided by a distrust of Congress and structural concerns regarding interaction among
Congress, the Court, and the states.250 In one respect, the Court has suspected that
disproportionate, excessive remedies create a windfall to Congress in allowing it to
enact legislation beyond its enumerated power.251 Section 5, the Court has held, does
not authorize substantive legislation regarding legal rights, but only remedial legislation
responding to existing or threatened violations of constitutional rights.252 Excessive
remedies under Section 5 threaten to exceed the authorized scope of legislative power:
“If Congress were permitted to enact rules that it calls ‘prophylactic’ without any
proportionality review, it could increase its power under Section 5 geometrically.”253
Proportionality review thus helps to maintain the proper separation of powers at the
federal level.254
The relation between proportionality and separation of powers should be
underscored. It is fundamental to theories of limited government that
government bodies cannot be trusted to impose and observe limitations
on their own powers. Accordingly, limitations on power must come
from outside the body that exercises power—from the people and from
other government institutions. So proportionality as a limit on (for
example) legislative power cannot be left to legislative determination.255
Secondly, the Court expressed a structural concern with Congress usurping the
Court’s power to interpret the Constitution. “[I]t falls to this Court, not Congress, to
define the substance of constitutional guarantees. The ultimate interpretation and
determination of the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive meaning remains the
province of the Judicial Branch.”256 Commentators have thus concluded that the “Court
now views Section 5 power as a potential threat to the Court’s role as the ultimate

competition and false advertising); Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643 (1999) (invalidating Patent Remedy
Clarification Act which provides remedies for negligent patent infringement, whereas constitutional Due
Process is implicated only by intentional patent infringement that is not adequately redressed by the
state); see also Thomas, Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 247, at 338 & 338 n.160 (discussing cases).
250
See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 523-23; William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power After Tennessee v.
Lane, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 39, 40 (2004).
251
See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529 (finding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 to be “so
out of proportion” to the objective under the Free Exercise Clause that it could be understood only as an
attempt to work a “substantive change in constitutional protections.”).
252
Id. at 519, 521.
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Ristroph, supra note 47, at 287.
255
Id.
256
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728; see also Lane, 541 U.S. at 539 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that
proportionality test of Section 5 is to ensure that Congress does not usurp Court’s responsibility to define
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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expositor of the constitutional text.”257 The Court’s proportionality approach reflects
its insistence on primacy in defining constitutional rights, and its unwillingness to defer
to Congress’ own decisions as to how to wield its remedial power.258
The Court has also articulated a third structural concern of vertical federalism
and Congress’ potential encroachment upon states’ rights.259 In the Section 5 context,
the Court has endorsed state sovereignty as important to the proportionality calculus.
Thus, the Court struck down legislation as disproportionate because it lacked a causal
nexus to the identified constitutional harm, and thus intruded into the governance
prerogatives of the states.260 This states’ rights agenda dominated much of the
Rehnquist Court’s jurisprudence, both within and outside of the remedial cases. Indeed,
the dominant narrative of commentators on the Rehnquist Court tells “the story of a
Court obsessed with issues of federalism and, more specifically, dedicated to
recalibrating the balance between federal and state powers so as limit federal authority
and empower the states.”261
Given the overriding structural concerns guiding the Court’s Section 5
jurisprudence, proportionality was conceptualized as a rule of federalism, renewing the
historical primacy of states’ rights. Commentators attacked the proportionality standard
as a mere pretext for judicial activism and a mechanism to implement the views of the
conservative Justices on the Court.262 Then, surprisingly, in 2003, the Court upheld
legislation under Section 5 for the first time in nearly forty years.
2.

Double Take: Upholding Proportional Legislation

The Court changed course in Nevada v. Hibbs, when it upheld legislation under
Section 5 for the first time in recent history.263 In Hibbs, the Court upheld the Family
Medical Leave Act’s private damages provision for employees denied the opportunity
to take leave from work to care for a family member. Just one year later, the Court
again upheld legislation under Section 5, affirming Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act in Tennessee v. Lane. Commentators once again cried foul, this time
intimating that nothing but the personal proclivities of the Justices explained the
257
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differences in outcomes.264 The Court, however, claimed that it had finally come
across legislation that was appropriately proportionate to the identified harm.
The two cases shared one attribute that seemed to distinguish them from the
prior Section 5 cases. In Hibbs and Lane, the legislation implicated the operation of a
strong, fundamental right that had previously been identified and enforced by the
Court.265 The Court defined the scope of the “harm” more broadly in these cases than
in prior cases by identifying legal rights that were at the top of the judicial hierarchy of
protection – gender equality (Hibbs) and access to the courts (Lane).266 Under a
proportionality balance, a strong, broadly defined right supports the imposition of
strong, broadly defined remedies.
Hibbs was a relatively easy application of the Section 5 proportionality rule.267
In a 6-3 decision authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court upheld the Family
Medical Leave Act and its authorization of private damages against state employers.268
The FMLA targeted unconstitutional gender discrimination in the workplace and
enacted prophylactic measures specifying twelve-week unpaid family leave for both
sexes to address adverse employment action taken against women.269 The Court found
the FMLA to be proportionate to the harm because its broad scope of including men and
mandating specific times addressed widespread gender discrimination and the potential
reactions from recalcitrant employers to comply with family leave protections for
women.270
Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, changed his vote in Lane, returning to his
former distrust of congressional legislation.271 The Chief Justice dissented in the 5-4
decision on grounds that the proportionality standard had been grossly misapplied.272
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that the public accommodation provisions
of the Americans with Disabilities Act were a valid exercise of Section 5 power.273 The
majority identified the operative constitutional right as the fundamental right of access
to the courts, rather than lower-level equal protection right against disability
discrimination.274 The plaintiffs in the case, a disabled criminal defendant and a court
reporter, were wheelchair bound paraplegics who had been denied access to a public
264
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courthouse.275 The majority placed these specific constitutional violations into context
by setting them “against a backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment” in the
administration of public services and programs including marriage, voting, and juror
service.276 This expansive scope of harm against the disabled, according to the
majority, balanced the broad scope of the remedy enacted by Congress prohibiting the
exclusion or denial of benefits to a disabled person in the provision of any public
services and programs.277 Moreover, the majority emphasized the particularly tailored
and limited scope of the ADA remedial legislation.278 Congress required only that
“reasonable accommodations” be made for the disabled, and did not require a public
entity to do everything possible.279 The narrow scope of the enacted remedy coupled
with the broad scope of the identified harm established the proportional balance needed
to uphold the legislation.
Chief Justice Rehnquist was incensed by the inartful application of the
proportionality standard.280 “While the Court today pays lipservice to the ‘congruence
and proportionality’ test, it applies it in a manner inconsistent with our recent
precedent.”281 He faulted the majority for attempting to “rig the congruence-andproportionality test by artificially constricting the scope of the statute to closely mirror a
recognized constitutional right.”282 He criticized the majority for selecting the
fundamental right of access to the courts as the operative right, but relying upon
evidence of widespread discrimination against the disabled in non-court settings like
marriage, voting, and public education to justify the law.283 Rehnquist found “nothing
in the legislative record or statutory findings to indicate that disabled persons were
systematically denied” the right of access to the courts.284 Given the “near-total lack of
actual constitutional violations in the congressional record,” the dissenters would have
invalidated the remedial legislation as in Garrett.285 Rehnquist also criticized Congress
for the “massive overbreadth” of the remedial legislation that covered a panoply of
rights, including access to amusement parks and hockey games, extending far beyond
the scope of the plaintiffs’ rights to court.286
Commentators have generally attacked the Court’s application of proportionality
in the Section 5 cases as nothing more than conservative politics.287 It is true that three
275
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Justices (Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas) have consistently voted to invalidate
legislation. And two others (Justices Souter and Breyer) have consistently voted to
affirm legislation. However, four Justices (Stevens, Rehnquist, O’Connor, and
Ginsburg) have switched sides during these cases. Professor William Arazia explained
the difference in the recent cases as of one of “mood,” finding that “while Lane's actual
review of the evidence is not marked by any self-conscious alteration of pre-existing
law, that review surely reveals a more lenient mood than does the analogous review in
Garrett and previous cases. . . .”288 The Court, however, has explained the variation as
nothing more than the proper operation of the proportionality rule, which serves to
ferret out inappropriate remedies while upholding those which are properly tailored.
D.

The Exception to the Rule: Justice Scalia Rejects Proportionality

Justice Scalia stands as the one Justice who expressly rejects remedial
proportionality. In all civil remedial contexts (save injunctions), Scalia has refused to
apply the proportionality standard. Citing the inherent subjectivity of proportionality,
he has disavowed it as “insusceptible of principled application.”289
In the punitive damages cases, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas,
criticized the use of remedial proportionality, arguing that it is “constrained by no
principle other than the Justices' subjective assessment of the ‘reasonableness’ of the
award in relation to the conduct for which it was assessed.”290 Elaborating on the
subjectivity, Scalia attacked the Court’s use of proportionality analysis, claiming it
reflected “a judgment about the appropriate degree of indignation or outrage, which is
hardly an analytical determination.”291
In truth, the “guideposts” mark a road to nowhere; they provide no real
guidance at all. . . . One expects the Court to conclude: “To thine own
self be true.” These crisscrossing platitudes yield no real answers in no
real cases. . . . The Court has constructed a framework that does not
genuinely constrain, that does not inform state legislatures and lower
courts—that does nothing at all except confer an artificial air of doctrinal
analysis upon its essentially ad hoc determination that this particular
award of punitive damages was not “fair.”292
The claims against proportionality for punitive damages proffered by Scalia and
Thomas are bound up in their position that the Constitution does not protect against
excessive amounts of awards.293 Rather than federal review of state awards, the
288
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dissenting Justices would defer to the jury as to the proper measure of relief, subject to
weak judicial review by state courts for reasonableness.294
Similarly, in Hibbs and Lane Justice Scalia rejected the remedial proportionality
standard, despite his acknowledged adherence to the rule in the previous litany of
Section 5 cases.295 Scalia thus found himself dissenting from the Court’s decision
upholding legislative remedial programs. This result is ironic given Scalia’s
jurisprudential belief in deference to the legislative branches, and in Congress as the
most democratic of the three governmental branches.296 In Lane, Scalia reasserted
those deferential proclivities on a larger scale, rejecting the proportionality review
altogether in the Section 5 context.297
I yield to the lessons of experience. The “congruence and
proportionality” standard, like all such flabby tests, is a standing
invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decisionmaking.
Worse still, it casts this Court in the role of Congress’s taskmaster.
Under it, the courts (and ultimately this Court) must regularly check
Congress’s homework to make sure that it has identified sufficient
constitutional violations to make its remedy congruent and proportional.
As a general matter, we are ill advised to adopt or adhere to
constitutional rules that bring us into constant conflict with a coequal
branch of Government.298
Such engagement with Congress was exacerbated, Scalia said, by the use of a
test that “cannot be shown to have been met or failed.”299 Thus, his rejection of
proportionality was driven in part by its inherent subjectivity. As Scalia explained, “I
have generally rejected tests based on such malleable standards as ‘proportionality,’
because they have a way of turning into vehicles for the implementation of individual
judges’ policy preferences.”300
This disavowal parallels Justice Scalia’s rejection of proportionality in the
criminal context. He has rejected proportionality review of criminal sentences
altogether, finding the oversight of criminal punishments to be inherently subjective and
incapable of intelligent application.301 While Scalia is thus consistent in his rejection
of proportionality, the Court is not. Many commentators have addressed the
inconsistencies between the Court’s escalation of proportionality review for civil
294
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remedies and its rejection of the strict standard for criminal sanctions.302 The Court’s
experience with the strict proportionality standard over several decades in the criminal
context led it to conclude that such a standard was too malleable to provide sufficient
meaning and guidance.303 Instead, the majority of the Court adopted a weak
proportionality standard for reviewing punishments in non-capital cases.304 This weak
standard of “gross disproportionality” examines sentences only to see if they are
extreme, rather than carefully calibrated, and reversal is reserved for the rare case.305
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan, explained, “The
Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between the crime and
sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to
the crime.”306 Applying the gross disproportionality standard, the Court has upheld
sentences of 25 years to life for recidivists stealing three golf clubs307 or $150 in
videos.308
Similarly, in the excessive fines case of United States v. Bajakajian, Justice
Thomas explained that the principle of proportionality in criminal law requires that “the
amount of forfeiture bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is
designed to punish.”309 He acknowledged that “just how proportional to a criminal
offense a fine must be will be inherently imprecise.”310 This imprecision, he explained,
justified the adoption of a gross disproportionality standard, rather than a strict standard
mandating precise proportionality of a sentence.311 Under this standard, the defendant’s
fine of $357,144, the full amount of the cash he failed to declare when leaving the
country, was held to be grossly disproportionate to the statutory fine of $5,000.312 Thus,
Justice Thomas seems to accept some level of proportionality review for criminal
sanctions despite his rejection of such a rule for punitive damages.
Despite its experience with the difficulties of proportionality analysis in the
criminal context, the Court continues to embrace proportionality review of civil
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remedies. Indeed, the Court, other than Justice Scalia and perhaps Justice Thomas,
appears willing to rely increasingly on proportionality in the context of remedies.
Exploring the Court’s motivations for the proportionality principle in remedies, it
appears that the Court is determined to continue on its current course.
III.

JUSTIFYING PROPORTIONAL REMEDIES

The Supreme Court has not expressly articulated the reasons why it has
embraced proportionality as the judicial standard for assessing whether relief is
appropriate. Yet woven through its decisions are clues as to the motivations guiding the
Justices in their near-universal adoption of proportionality for remedies. Implicit in the
decisions are concerns about structural and legal integrity that seem to be motivating the
Court. Three justifications emerge from reading between the lines of these cases: the
need for objectivity in decisionmaking; the belief in judicial restraint and minimalism;
and the curtailment of excessive litigation and remedies. All three of these justifications
lead to limiting the exercise of the remedial power, whether that relief stems from the
lower courts, juries, or Congress.
These three implicit justifications for the proportionality rule mirror the core
concerns embodied in the international norm of proportionality: rationality, restraint,
and reciprocity.313 These “three Rs” define the core of proportionality analysis and
provide guidance in evaluating governmental action.314 When considering the
rationality of a governmental action, international courts first evaluate whether the
action is appropriate, arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations.315
International courts then ask whether the governmental response is restrained, taking
into account the availability of less restrictive alternatives.316 Finally, international
courts look for reciprocity, or proper fit between the harm and the judicial measure.317
Together, these three Rs create a rule of minimal governmental action.
These same three global principles are reflected in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
own homegrown version of remedial proportionality. The three Rs provide an
organizational framework for understanding the Court’s justifications for remedial
proportionality. The principle of rationality is embodied in the Court’s emphasis on an
objective, logical standard to constrain biased decisionmaking. The principle of
restraint is seen in the Court’s embrace of judicial minimalism and preference for the
least-restrictive remedy. And the principle of reciprocity is evident in the Court’s
concerns with defendants being asked to respond to a wrong with a remedy in excess of
the amount of harm caused.
There is, however, one crucial distinction between the international norm of
proportionality and the U.S. Supreme Court’s remedial proportionality rule. While the
rest of the world uses proportionality to protect plaintiffs, the Supreme Court uses
proportionality to insulate defendants. On the international level, the norm of
313
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proportionality is generally used to protect plaintiffs against governmental intrusion.318
Proportionality is used as a mechanism of judicial review to prevent exercises of
excessive legislative and executive power that infringe on individual rights.319
Conversely, the remedial proportionality principle of the Supreme Court is used to
curtail excessive judicial intrusions into the interests of government and corporate
defendants.320 Both approaches share a theory of limited government, but the American
approach applies this theory to benefit only defendants. It encourages, rather than
prevents, the trumping of governmental interests to outweigh individual rights, thus
turning the principle of individual freedom on its head.
This section seeks to flesh out the reasons why an Americanized remedial
proportionality principle has emerged. Viewing the cases from the Court’s perspective,
this section lays out the justifications given by the Court for its adoption of a rule of
proportional relief.
A. Rationality: The Pursuit of Objectivity
The Court believes that the proportionality standard in remedies provides an
objective judicial measurement that ensures the rationality of judicial decisions.
Rationality seeks a logical basis for legal reasoning that is not based on arbitrary, unfair,
or biased grounds. In the punitive damages cases, for example, the Court has been
concerned with punitives based on jury bias rather than “objective” measures.321 The
proportionality standard injects an objective standard into the judicial decisionmaking
process providing a logical basis for remedial decisions. The Court, perhaps like many
lay people, assumes that judicial discretion is potentially unbounded. As the old legal
maxim states, “equity is as long as a chancellor’s foot,” meaning that what is “fair”
varies randomly from judge to judge.322
This search for objectivity was the crux of the judicial debate in TXO, in which
the Court first began to consider a proportionality standard for punitive damages.323
The perceived need for an objective standard to avoid caprice and bias in
decisionmaking was the guiding principle that steered the Court towards the eventual
adoption of remedial proportionality rule. The Justices and the parties recognized the
importance of an objective standard; they simply disagreed as whether the standard was
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quantitative, qualitative, or both.324 Justice O’Connor explained the need for objective
rules of decision to avoid “arbitrariness, caprice, passion, bias, and even malice [that]
can replace reasoned judgment and law as the basis for jury decisionmaking.”325 She
then pushed the Court to develop specific objective factors to further refine that
decisionmaking:
As an initial matter, constitutional judgments should not be, or appear to
be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices. Without objective
criteria on which to rely, almost any decision regarding proportionality
will be a matter of personal preference. One judge's excess very well
may be another's moderation. To avoid that element of subjectivity, our
judgments should be informed by objective factors to the maximum
possible extent.326
The Court thus developed objective factors to further direct the exercise of
proportionality review. The Court enunciated several three-part tests to approach the
proportionality decision in a logical fashion. For injunctions, the proportionality review
must measure the scope of the harm, match the scope of relief, and account for the
interests of state defendants.327 For punitive damages, the Court must evaluate the
“three guideposts” of the reprehensibility of the conduct, the amount of compensatory
damages, and the availability of other sanctions.328 And for Section 5 remedies, the
Court must identify the contours of the constitutional right at issue, identify the
evidence in support of a history of demonstrated harms, and evaluate the proper scope
of a congruent and proportional remedy.329 In each case, the Court is simply
elaborating on the basic balancing concept of matching the scope of the remedy to the
scope of the harm. The establishment of additional objective factors aims to define the
proportionality standard and standardize the judicial decisionmaking.
Proportionality thus purports to provide the transparency of reason to counter
the notions of subjective remedial discretion.330 As Justice Roberts expressed in his
concurrence in eBay, “discretion is not whim. It is based on legal principles that are
needed to establish consistency across the cases.”331 The legal principle of
324

Petitioners argued for a qualitative, comparative test to other punitive awards, 509 U.S. at 455,
Kennedy concurred in favor of an individual qualitative assessment, id. at 467-68, the plurality adopted a
quantitative comparison of punitives to potential harm, id. at 460, and O’Connor included both
mathematical and qualitative factors in her standard. Id. at 480-82. This debate over a qualitative or
quantitative proportionality standard for punitive damages is at issue again in the case of Phillip Morris v.
Williams pending in the U.S. Supreme Court. See discussion infra.
325
Id. at 474-75 (quoting W. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 175 (1991)).
326
Id. at 480-81 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
327
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977).
328
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418; Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.
329
Lane, 541 U.S. at 538-54 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) (clearly laying out the three-part inquiry
developed in prior cases); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366-67.
330
Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up the
Conversation on ‘Proportionality,’ Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 617 (1999).
331
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2005) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).

43

REMEDIAL PROPORTIONALITY

proportionality provides transparency by calling for rational explanations to appear in
judicial decisions, thus providing added legitimacy to the rule of law. Application of
the standard and its attendant factors allows us to view the operation of justice as a
mechanical operation, and thus counters the criticism of judicial discretion as personal
whim. It is the rule’s transparency that helps to maintain the credibility of the rule of
law by militating against claims of bias.
Finally, the assumed objectivity of the proportionality standard is designed to
provide consistency across the judicial system. This perceived consistency provides the
model of a level playfield in the law. For example, proportionality provides a consistent
standard in punitive damages that the Court says provides adequate notice to defendants
of potential penalties.332 The use of formulas, ratios, and three-factored tests provides
the appearance of objectivity necessary to avoid the caprice of the decisionmaker.
Thus, the proportionality rule emerged in part as an antidote to biased decisionmaking.
Its principle of balanced justice satisfied the demand for rationality in judicial
decisionmaking to preserve the rule of law.
B. Restraint: A Rule of Judicial Minimalism
The Court has also justified its remedial proportionality test in the injunctions
context as a rule of judicial restraint. The Court has articulated rules requiring the least
restrictive remedy motivated by proper deference to the legislative and executive
branches. This results in an overarching preference for modest, narrowly tailored
remedies that provide relief to plaintiff at the least cost or burden to the defendant.333
An example of the Court’s motivation of remedial judicial restraint can be seen
in Ayotte, where the Court refused to uphold a broad injunction striking down a New
Hampshire abortion law for minors that impermissibly failed to include an exception for
the preservation of the minor’s health.334 The Court criticized the courts below for
choosing the “most blunt remedy” rather than more narrowly tailored relief.335 In
vacating the overbroad remedy, the Court announced a general preference for the least
restrictive remedy, mindful of its own limited institutional competence.336 The Court
noted concerns with crafting more comprehensive remedies because such “line-drawing
is inherently complex” and risks “serious invasion of the legislative domain.”337 The
Ayotte Court thus embraced the remedial rule of proportionality and the preference for
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“modest” remedies based on deference to the legislature and notions of judicial
incompetence.338
The Court’s reasoning evidences a theory of judicial passivity or minimalism.339
Justice O’Connor, the author of the unanimous Ayotte opinion, was the leading
minimalist on the Supreme Court.340 The minimalist approach seeks to “reduce the role
of judicial lawmaking” and advance the theme that the Court’s power and that of the
federal courts is sharply limited.341 Under this guise, courts are incompetent to craft
remedies for ordinary litigants and must act cautiously, mindful of this disability.342
The proportionality principle’s rule of remedial restraint advances this theory of limited
judicial competence. Whether the cases are rationalized by federalist notions of respect
for the states or deference to the legislature,343 the result is that the courts are
encouraged to be more restrained in remedying violations of the law.
The irony is that this belief in the Court’s limited competence and deferential
treatment of the legislature does not emerge as a rationale for the use of remedial
proportionality in the cases of punitive damages or Section 5 remedies. In contrast, the
Court in these contexts distrusts the legislature, whether Congressional enactments of
new protections or the state legislatures’ failure to enact tort reform.344
The reconciling factor is a broader belief in remedial minimalism and a hostility
to litigation as means of providing social justice. 345 As Professor Siegel has suggested,
the Court appears hostile to litigation and its remedial rewards as the way of resolving
social issues, and thus the Rehnquist Court’s cases have “directly and consistently
moved to limit both access to and the remedial power of the federal courts.”346 For
example, in Campbell, the Court noted that “a more modest punishment for this
reprehensible conduct could have satisfied the State’s legitimate objectives, and the
Utah courts should have gone no further.”347 Thus, as Siegel concludes, the
“contentious struggles over remedial issues that litter the Rehnquist Court’s case reports
are not battles over whether the Court should cut back on judicial discretion, equitable
remedies, or litigation-positive interpretive strategies but instead disputes over how far
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such a trend should go.”348 Remedial minimalism explains the Court’s preference for
modest judicial relief.
C.

Reciprocity: Curbing Remedial Excess

The third motivation for proportionality found in the remedies cases is the need
for reciprocity between remedy and harm in order to curb remedial excess. The Court
perceives remedial excess in injunctions that micromanage public institutions, punitives
that bankrupt companies, and windfall recoveries that make attorneys millionaires.
Public schools are ordered to build planetariums, and wealthy doctors win millions
when their Beemers are repainted.349 The overreaching in many cases has triggered a
rebound effect in which the Court has reacted by crafting a rule of proportionality to
block the excess. Such excess cannot be seen as reciprocal or corresponding to the
proven harm when it fails to match the scope or gravity of the violation. Reciprocity in
which the remedy provides an equivalent counterpart to the harm restores a sense of
balance to the judicial arena at a time when excess appears to run rampant.
The first premise behind the reciprocity rationale is the Court’s strong antipathy
toward remedial windfalls. The punitive damages cases are replete with exclamations
denouncing the outrageous rise of the remedy. Punitives are “skyrocketing,” awards are
“monstrous,” and the system has “run wild.” 350 The Court is reacting to a perceived
problem of remedial excess, despite recent scholarship denying the problem.351 As
Professor Siegel aptly described, the Court believes that “the American system of
compensation for private injuries is desperately out of control, producing untold riches
for plaintiffs’ lawyers and mammoth rewards for a handful of lucky litigants, warping
the incentive structures for businesses and professionals, and causing a concomitant loss
of efficiency and societal wealth.”352
Underlying the reciprocity rationale is a distrust of society’s factfinders. The
Court distrusts the juries, judges, and legislatures, believing that left to their own
druthers, these decisionmakers will overreach to the extent possible. This distrust is
evident in the punitive damages context, where some Justices have expressed fears that
uninformed juries biased against big business will engage in random social
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redistribution.353 In public law injunction cases, the distrust is directed against activist
judges who allegedly act to advance their own liberal theories of social justice.354 And
in the Section 5 context, the Court suspects that the legislature will take every
opportunity to exceed the boundaries of Section 5 and legislate broadly for the general
welfare, contrary to judicial interpretations of the Constitution.355
Armed with this distrust, the reciprocal commands of proportionality impose
limits to restore the balance of justice. Proportionality works as a limitation on the
remedy, requiring an equivalent societal response to wrong. This reciprocity, like the
Moseaic “an eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth,” demands parallel response and nothing
more.356 The command of an eye for an eye was originally instituted as a limitation to
restrain people from over-punishing wrongs.357 The people’s inclination in Biblical
times, perhaps as now, was to respond to wrongdoing with retribution and vengeance.358
The Old Testament command was meant to restrict this impulse by instilling remedial
power solely in magistrates, and requiring them to craft proportional responses.359
The use of a proportionality standard to restrict the inappropriate excess of
response to wrongdoing thus explains the Supreme Court’s motivation in its modern
remedial proportionality cases. It views the world as one in which remedies have
crossed over to vengeance due to the overreaching of judges into policymaking and
remedial excess. Defendants receive vengeance, rather than appropriate sanctions, by a
system run amuck with overly harsh remedies. The doctrinal rule of proportionality is
meant to restrict this retributive judicial policymaking and misuse of discretion, limiting
judicial remedies to more appropriate, “civilized” responses.
IV.

THE MYTH OF PROPORTIONALITY AND ITS ATTENDANT
DANGERS

The application of the proportionality principle, however belies the myth
of neutrality. Indeed, any utilization of the principle beyond the theoretical
necessarily implicates the very use of judicial discretion and subjectivity the rule
seeks to avoid. Beyond the misconception of proportionality as an inherently
evenhanded standard lies the risk of danger from buying in too strongly to this
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rule. Proportionality as currently applied by the Supreme Court in its strict
remedial form risks the adoption of a rule of Supreme Court judicial supremacy
that elevates the preferences of defendant wrongdoers above justice to plaintiffs.
This perversion of the remedial process into protection for the wrongdoer is a
threat to the rule of law that must be addressed.
A.

The Mask of Objectivity

The lure of objective remedial proportionality is a mirage. The establishment of
a doctrinal rule and the identification of component objective factors does not save the
standard from subjectivity. Rather, as some Justices and commentators have noted,
proportionality remains an inherently subjective standard.360 Professor Karlan put it
succinctly: “proportionality is both an inherently alluring and an inevitably
unsatisfactory measure of constitutionality . . . . The problem lies in translating the
principle into a standard for judicial oversight. For all the Court’s invocation of
objective factors, it turns out that a key aspect of proportionality review remains
fundamentally subjective.”361 This inherent subjectivity is compounded when its
transparency is shrouded by a rule that seems to require precise, objective measurement.
Subjectivity is inherent in the proportionality analysis, from the initial framing
of the question to the selection and evaluation of qualitative factors. Justice Kennedy
made this point in arguing against the adoption of a proportionality standard for
punitive damages in TXO (though he later signed on to the proportionality standard in
BMW and State Farm):
To ask whether a particular award of punitive damages is grossly
excessive begs the question: excessive in relation to what? The answer
excessive in relation to the conduct of the tortfeasor may be correct, but
it is unhelpful, for we are still bereft of any standard by which to
compare the punishment to the malefaction that gave rise to it. A
reviewing court employing this formulation comes close to relying upon
nothing more than its own subjective reaction to a particular punitive
damages award in deciding whether the award violates the Constitution.
This type of review, far from imposing meaningful, law-like restraints on
jury excess, could become as fickle as the process it is designed to
superintend. Furthermore, it might give the illusion of judicial certainty
where none in fact exists . . . .362
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The objectivity of the proportionality principle is skewed from the start by the
way in which the Court frames the question. The Court must ask whether the remedy is
proportional, but proportional to what? The ability to alter the comparison point
demonstrates the manipulability of the proportionality rule. It is this manipulability in
the framing of the proportionality question that renders the standard subjective. For
example, in the punitive damages context, the Court can frame the proportionality
comparison as punitives compared to compensatories,363 to actual harm,364 to potential
harm,365 or to reprehensibility of the conduct.366 As Justice Ginsburg noted, the result
as to the validity of punitive measures varies depending on the reframing of the
question: “By switching the focus from the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages
to the potential loss to the plaintiffs had the defendant succeeded in its illicit scheme,
the Court could describe the relevant ratio in TXO as 10 to 1” rather than the 526 to 1
achieved by comparing punitives to actual harm.367
The framing problem was at the heart of the debate over a punitive damages
award in the recently decided Philip Morris v. Williams.368 The Oregon Supreme Court
awarded punitive damages of $79.5 million against Philip Morris, an amount 97 times
greater than the compensatory damages awarded, because of the company’s extreme
reprehensibility in defrauding consumers as to the dangers of tobacco smoking.369
Philip Morris argued in its briefs to the Supreme Court that damages should be
measured solely by the mathematical ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, as
highlighted in Campbell.370 Mrs. Williams, the widow of a man who died of lung
cancer caused by smoking, framed the proportionality issue differently; she argued that
the proportionality of the punitive award must be balanced against both the quantitative
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages and the qualitative factor of the
tobacco company’s reprehensibility.371 Thus, the proper amount of punitive damages
could have turned simply on how the proportionality question was framed, dictating the
components compared and the qualitative or quantitative nature of the inquiry. The
framing of the question alone would have dictated the result—a straightforward
363
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quantitative computation would have easily concluded that the $79.5 million award was
excessive. The Supreme Court, however, avoided the proportionality question
altogether, remanding the case on an alternative ground due to the jury’s improper
consideration of the defendant’s conduct towards third parties in the punitive damages
calculus.372
The framing problem is apparent in other instances of remedial proportionality.
In the context of attorney fees, fees can be balanced against the amount of damages, the
total relief, or the “public benefit” obtained. This was the issue in City of Riverside v.
Rivera, where the defendants argued for a strict proportionality of the fees awarded
($300,000) to damages obtained ($32,000) to invalidate the award.373 The Court
entertained a comparison of fees to total relief granted ($32,000 and no injunction), but
ultimately upheld the award by framing the question as fees compared to the “public
benefit” obtained in the exposure of discriminatory police misconduct.374
In the desegregation cases, the validity of the school decrees varies by the
framing of the initial question of proportionality. At times, the desegregation cases
have allowed remedies to address de facto segregation, while at other times it has not.
When the question has been framed to include economic and housing segregation as
part of the “harm” through a series of causal links and presumptions, the remedy for de
facto segregation as been upheld.375 When the “harm” is isolated to include only the
school’s affirmative acts of segregation, then the approved remedy has been
narrowed.376 In Jenkins, the lower court tried to frame the scope of the harm to include
white flight, arguing it was causally linked to the segregation because when segregation
was prohibited, white residents fled to the suburbs.377 Accordingly, a valid remedy
could address that consequence by creating high quality magnet schools to attract
students back from suburbs. A five-Justice majority of the Court rejected this depiction,
and reframed the question to circumscribe the relevant harm to include only the initial
segregation of school assignments.378
Subjectivity thus drives the framing question as the courts decide what will be
placed upon the scale to balance against the remedy. Because proportionality is an
ends-means test, “how broadly or how narrowly the Court conceptualizes the proper
unit of analysis will matter in every” case.379 The subjective manipulation inherent in
the definition of the problem explains the widely disparate results in Lane and Garrett
as to the constitutionality of legislative remedies under separate titles of the Americans
with Disabilities Act. In Lane, the plaintiffs’ specific right at issue – that of access to
the courts – was placed within the broader context of disability discrimination in society
372
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to conceptualize a broad problem justifying broad legislative remedies.380 Garrett in
contrast, evaluated only the particular violation suffered by the plaintiff, employment
discrimination by the state, and expressly excluded from consideration the generalized
context of disability discrimination.381 Both Lane and Garrett were 5-4 decisions, but
with the switch of Justice O’Connor, the remedial disability legislation was upheld
when conceptualizing the problem as one of broad, societal harm.
In this way, the framing question undermines the alleged neutrality of the
remedial proportionality standard by significantly altering the question that must be
answered. Once the question is framed, the remedial question of matching
proportionality is relatively easy to answer. The answer to the proportionality analysis
simply depends upon the question asked, and that question varies depending upon the
eye of the beholder. Therefore, the proportionality standard masks underlying judicial
subjectivity by feigning objectivity and neutrality. It subverts the normative questions
by making remedial decisions seem mechanical, objective, and straightforward when
they are not.
Add to this framing discretion a secondary level of subjectivity which enters
judicial decisions by the selection of the analytical inputs for the proportionality
calculus. Subjectivity enters into the decisionmaking as the judges select the
appropriate inputs for consideration – for example evaluating the magnitude of the harm
or the reprehensibility of the conduct. In the punitive damages context, what is
“reprehensible”? 382 The seriousness of a harm is not a universal, timeless fact, but
rather turns upon the views of the individual judges.383 Though “dressed up as a legal
opinion, it is really no more than a disagreement with the community’s sense of
indignation or outrage expressed in the punitive award of the . . . jury.”384 As Justice
Scalia argued in BMW, judicial review “reflects not merely a judgment about a matter
of degree, but a judgment about the appropriate degree of indignation or outrage, which
is hardly an analytical determination. . . . There is no precedential warrant for giving
our judgment priority over the judgment of state courts and juries on this matter.”385
Thus, as Professor Spencer put it, the “objective” guideposts of proportionality are just
as subjective as the “Takes-the-Judicial-Breath-Away-and-Raises-the-JudicialEyebrows Test: all involve the Supreme Court in making its own determinations on
behalf of an entire nation.”386
B. Dangerous Deference to the Defendants
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Remedial proportionality as currently utilized by the Supreme Court is a
defendant-friendly concept. The Court has co-opted the international norm of
proportionality as protection for victims and used it as a sword to cut down plaintiffs’
rights. It has perverted the international norm by fashioning a rule of protection of
“fundamental rights” for corporate defendants, institutional actors, and states.387
This pro-defendant bias has been well-documented in a series of articles by
Professor Wendy Parker examining injunctive relief in discrimination cases.388 In
tracing the Court’s desegregation cases and the resulting doctrinal rules of injunctive
proportionality, Parker has seen a shocking rule of deference to defendants at the
plaintiffs’ expense.389 She concludes: “The Supreme Court's approach to school
desegregation in particular and public law remedies in general has prevented lower
court judges from undertaking principled, well-grounded remedial processes and has
ceded too much remedial power to the defendants, the alleged or adjudicated
wrongdoer.”390 Similarly, the cases on punitive damages demonstrate a primary
concern with the welfare of the defendant.391 And even the Section 5 cases align with
the defendant states over the individual victims or the people’s protectors in
Congress.392
The Supreme Court’s pro-defendant remedial bias is dangerous in two respects.
First, it fails to create the incentives necessary to alter illegal behavior. If defendants
control the remedies, and courts must abide by the defendants’ interests in crafting
remedies, then there is less incentive to change illegal behavior. Justice O’Connor
recognized this pitfall in Ayotte where she acknowledged the potential invitation to state
legislatures to carelessly legislate and leave it to the courts to sort out. Similarly, in the
punitive damages context, the remedial proportionality rule encourages careless
behavior by potential wrongdoers.393 A proportionality rule in which defendants
receive relatively insubstantial penalties is “simply [] a tolerable cost of a certain course
of action, provided the ultimate benefits to be gained outweigh that cost.”394 Thus, it
will likely “influence the tortfeasor’s rational-cost minimizing choice with respect to the
utilization of reasonable and/or reprehensible input activities. If the price of
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reprehensible input activities decreases relative to the price of reasonable input
activities, then one can anticipate an increase in such reprehensible activities.”395
Second, the pro-defendant remedial bias skews the supposed balance of rights
inherent in proportionality by prioritizing defendants’ rights at the expense of
plaintiffs.396 Missing from these cases is any concern for when plaintiffs are accorded
too little relief.397 The Supreme Court does not strictly review motions for additur of
punitive damages or enhance punitive damage awards to address the fact that a payyour-own attorney fee system leaves the injured plaintiff less than fully compensated.
In other words, proportionality is not a two-way street. The Court appears unconcerned
with disproportionality that harms plaintiffs.
There is therefore a significant cost associated with this pro-defendant rule: the
very real risk of under-enforcement of the law.398 The result may have some appeal to
Justices who believe that the legal system has run amok and that certain remedies, like
structural injunctions and punitive damages, should not in fact be enforced. But the
real cost is to plaintiffs and to the legal system. Plaintiffs have the burden of initiating
lawsuits, and incentives to do so have been lessened. As between the two parties in the
lawsuit, where remedial measures are at issue, the plaintiff is the one who has suffered
harm, and the defendant the wrongdoer. Tipping the balance in favor of the defendant
signals that plaintiffs, and the laws that protect them, are not important.
C.

Unveiling Proportionality as Judicial Activism

By now it should be apparent that the remedial proportionality principle is not a
rule of minimalism, but rather a rule of judicial activism. The Supreme Court is not
taking the path of least resistance in these cases, but instead is actively engaged in
policymaking to displace the traditional remedial process. The evidence speaks for
itself. The quest for a rule of objectivity has in fact widened the doors for subjectivity.
Claims of minimalism and modesty have produced activism. And the cry for restraint
has resulted in the active overturning of carefully crafted remedies.
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This article’s revelation of the operation of remedial proportionality in the
Supreme Court cases supports the conclusion of others that this is one of the most
activist Courts in history.399 Remedial proportionality establishes a rule of judicial
supremacy in which the Court strikes down remedies with which it disagrees and enacts
remedial reform that could not pass the legislative branches.400 Proportionality becomes
the doctrinal mechanism by which the Supreme Court activates its judicial supremacy.
Ironically, while proportionality was intended as a rule to curb the alleged judicial
activism of the lower court exercising broad remedial power and issuing broad rulings,
proportionality has now transferred that activist potential to the highest court in the
land. 401
At some level, the term “judicial activism” is merely an epithet that can be
hurled at any court decision with which the accuser disagrees.402 Justice Ginsburg
stated during her confirmation hearings that judicial activism is "a label too often
pressed into service by critics of court results rather than the legitimacy of court
decisions."403 Conservatives have used the term to attack public law injunctions in
schools and prisons, while liberals have used the epithet to attack judicial invalidations
of social legislation.404 However, the judicial activism of proportionality analysis is
more than a simple disagreement over the content of the result.405 The activism results
from the displacement of the usual, centuries-old process of remedial judicial
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decisionmaking by a new higher Court supremacy. Such displacement of long-accepted
judicial process of crafting remedies is the essence of judicial activism.406
As demonstrated, proportionality analysis does not produce a rational, restrained
rule of judicial remedies. Instead, it replaces the normal remedial functioning of the
judicial process with a subjective rule of Supreme Court supremacy that gives the Court
the singular power to determine remedies.
V.

CONCLUSION: RESTORING DEFERENTIAL REVIEW OF
REMEDIES

The open question is whether this trend toward heightened scrutiny of remedial
decisions through the use of a proportionality standard will continue. Virtually every
member of the Court has advanced the cause of proportionality in one context or
another. The acceptance of the proportionality standard seems to cut across
jurisprudential lines and political sides, making it likely that such a standard will
survive in the near future.407 Yet, Justice O’Connor was a driving force in many of the
key remedial cases of the modern Court, and her absence may portend a change in the
remedial winds. It may also be that Justice Scalia’s rejection of proportionality in both
the civil and criminal contexts will garner additional support from the newest members
of the Court.
Armed with a more transparent understanding of remedial proportionality and its
false promises, legal scholars and jurists can begin to shake the belief in proportionality
as an absolute measure of objectivity. The focus of this article has been to debunk the
assumed validity of proportionality by deconstructing the rule and its strict application
by the Court. It does not conclude, however, without offering a recommendation for the
future. For as Elisabeth Zoller argues, the proportionality test “is a legal tool that is
neutral in itself. . . . it can be good or evil, depending on the use that is made of it. . . .
The problem is to learn how to use it.”408
The courts need to retain the ability to check for excessive remedies through the
process of deferential judicial review. Justice Scalia’s rejection of all remedial
oversight risks would prevent the Court from being able to capture remedial outliers
that deserve the Court’s disfavor, such as public school planetariums or $175 million
awards for emotional distress unaccompanied by personal injury. If reviewing courts
stop asking what remedy is “just right,” and instead look only for remedies that are
“grossly excessive,” the range of consensus is likely to increase as to what is in fact too
extreme. While the range of appropriate relief on the remedial spectrum is vast, the
spectrum’s extremes are more clear. Judgments about the relative excessiveness of
remedies are far more consistent than determinations of the absolute measure of precise
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remedial response.409 The relative consensus dilutes the impact of the inherent
subjectivity of the standard by addressing the extremes upon which most reasonable
people can agree, rather than turning on the personal views of a few individual judges.
Rejecting strict proportionality in favor of deferential judicial review is the
doctrinal path taken by the Supreme Court in the criminal proportionality cases. After
several decades of experience with a strict proportionality standard in the criminal
sentencing context, a majority of the Court has rejected it as unworkable and amenable
to judicial subjectivity.410 Instead, the Court has adopted a relatively deferential
principle of “narrow” proportionality under the Eighth Amendment.411 This weak
standard of “gross disproportionality” examines sentences only to see if they are
extreme, rather than carefully calibrated, and is reserved for the rare case.412 Under this
standard, the Court has upheld most of the sentences it has reviewed.413 The Court’s
experience with proportionality weighs in favor of such weak-form review under which
the gross disproportionality standard captures extreme cases.
Restoring the traditional standard of deference to remedial arbiters neutralizes
the increasing activism of the Court. Deferential review would mean the end of de novo
appellate review of remedies and the return to a respect of judges and juries crafting
remedies. There is a sound basis for a rule of deference in determining the proper
measure of relief because the factfinder is closer to the observed “truth” and facts.
Judicial policymaking is minimized by tying the decision more closely to the facts or
circumstances narrowly presented by each the case.
Thus, this article ultimately suggests restoring remedial proportionality analysis
to its traditional place as a tool of judicial review that is used sparingly to guide
remedial decisions. Returning to a moderate use of proportionality – call it narrow, or
weak, or reasonable – employs proportionality only as an outer check upon potentially
aberrant awards that go beyond the pale. The deference solution, in other words, is an
argument in favor of the way we were.
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